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Abstract of the Dissertation
The Political Economy of Poverty in the ‗Glocal‘ Context:
A Multilevel Cross-National Study

by
Philip Young P. Hong
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of Missouri—St. Louis, 2010
Professor Kenneth P. Thomas, Chair

The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which sociopolitico-economic factors at the structural level impact individual poverty
across 17 developed countries in a period of welfare state retrenchment and
growing international interconnectedness. This dissertation contributes to a
newly developing body of knowledge on cross-national comparison of
individual poverty using multilevel analyses. This method allows for
modeling various determinants of poverty (variables with different units of
analysis at both individual and structural levels) together in a single analysis.
The OECD and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data were used to
conduct a cross-national comparative analysis of 17 affluent economies. The
LIS is a cross-national data archive, one of the best harmonized database
sources for comparative studies on poverty and income distribution. In order
to examine the variations in poverty among individuals in advanced welfare
states, 17 countries were selected from LIS Wave 5 (around year 2000).
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Focusing on labor market active age group (between 18 and 65 years of age),
merging of the data for these countries yielded roughly 120,838 working-age
individuals in the sample.
Analyses leading up to the multilevel approach examined the
variations of social welfare effort among 110 countries by their socio-economic
and political development, poverty at the aggregate level in a series of
bivariate analyses of 17 affluent economies, and the local perspective of
individual poverty in the United States. Social welfare effort cross-nationally
is found to be conditioned primarily by the socio-economic determinants in
the larger global context.
Globalization and politics play a more significant positive role on social
welfare effort among the advanced democracies. Globalization also has a
positive effect on politics. While globalization does not have a direct effect on
aggregate poverty, politics and social welfare effort have significant effects.
Local determinants of poverty show that human capital and demographic
variables significantly affect poverty, but with differential effects of human
capital for the poor compared to the near poor.
The multilevel analyses provide a glocal perspective on explaining
individual poverty. Results indicate that individuals who reside in countries
with higher degree of globalization and greater left political power are less
likely to be poor. Plus, those residing in countries with higher welfare state
generosity and active labor market policies are less likely to be poor.
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Controlling for individual level demographic and human capital variables,
the global and nation level structural variables were found to be significant.
Individual poverty is affected by: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation
of the poor; cumulative left party power; and union density]; and (3) social
welfare commitment [welfare generosity; active labor market policies; and
public educational expenditure]. Implications for U.S. poverty and
glocalization strategies to tackle structural poverty are discussed.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This introduction section provides the overview of the dissertation.
This dissertation attempts to investigate the individual and structural
determinants of individual poverty. Supported by the structuration theory
that views state actors not only as being influenced by external and internal
structures but also causing variations in these structures, the dissertation
understands the concept of ‗self‘ within this type of dynamic global system
and subsystems. Considering multiple layers of causal factors, I suggest that
individual poverty be understood from a ‗glocal‘ perspective. Here, lack of
human capital within the local context could reflect the consequence of
structural vulnerability of the poor vis-à-vis the global system and the
national subsystems (Rank 2004).
Guided by these theoretical orientations, the dissertation asks to what
extent socio-politico-economic variables, given individual human capital,
demographic, and household structures, affect poverty at the individual level.
Employing a cross-national comparative method, the dissertation first
analyzes the interplay of structural—i.e., global and national level—variables
as they affect welfare state and poverty at the aggregate level. Then, it
examines the interplay of individual factors affecting individual level poverty
in the United States. These two perspectives were combined in analyses of
multilevel models of 17 affluent democracies in order to answer the main
question.
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1.1.

Problem Issue and Purpose
This dissertation focuses on the issue of poverty both at the aggregate

and individual levels. It is maintained that poverty results from the natural
workings of the global economic system, but the degree to which the political
system exercises power vis-à-vis the global market determines social welfare
commitment and poverty. Active government involvement to ensure ‗social
rights‘ for its citizens makes economic well-being a key common good issue,
while failure to organize the public will to remedy poverty keeps it a
bootstrap issue. In this regard, globalization, politics, and social welfare
commitment represent the structural socio-politico-economic environment
contributing to the consequence of poverty.
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which these sociopolitico-economic factors at the structural level impact aggregate and
individual level poverty across affluent democracies during a period of
growing international interconnectedness and welfare state retrenchment.
Employing a multilevel study, the dissertation seeks to understand the
interplay among the nation-level social, political and economic factors and
individual labor market and demographic factors as they affect individual
poverty outcome.
The dissertation will provide answers to the following research
questions:
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1. To what extent are socio-economic and political development associated
with social welfare effort of nation-states in general? [Chapter 2]
2. Controlling for socio-economic and political development, how do
globalization and politics affect social welfare effort among affluent
democracies? [Chapter 2]
3. What are the effects of socio-politico-economic factors on poverty at the
aggregate level in affluent democracies? [Chapter 3]
4. What are the effects of socio-politico-economic structural factors, along
with individual factors, on poverty at the individual level in affluent
democracies? [Chapter 4 & 5]
The dissertation portrays contemporary society as workings of both
global and local forces and structures the world as a global society.
Understanding poverty requires thinking globally about its structural causes
and linking local particularities—hence ‗glocalizing‘ structural poverty—to
improve the well-being of individuals and families as the social policy
outcome. In this respect, application of glocal knowledge on social policy and
poverty can help plan for eradication of poverty in this highly complex,
globalized world-system.

1.2. Significance of the Issue
Jeffery Sachs estimates that about 1 billion world citizens live in
extreme poverty and another 1.5 billion live in poverty; this totals
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approximately 40% of humanity. The world has made great economic
progress over the centuries, but ―at a different rate in different regions‖ (2005,
31). Fed by a confluence of factors in recent history—notably technological
innovation—the gap between the richest economies and the poorest regions
has widened to twenty to one. In this global environment, Sachs maintains,
the poor are caught in a poverty trap and challenged by structural forces that
―keep them from getting even their first foot on the ladder of development‖
(2005, 226).
Government involvement in social welfare has been most extensive in
Western industrialized countries since the early 1900s (Dixon and Scheurell
2002; Esping-Andersen 1990; Ginsburg 1992; Pierson 1991). These
governments have intervened to promote the welfare of their citizens, and
thus they have acquired the name ―welfare states‖ (Finer 1999, 16-17;
Midgley 1997, 79) and have enjoyed their ―golden years‖ roughly from 1945 to
1975 (Dixon and Scheurell 2002, 237; Esping-Andersen, 1996, 1). During
these years, many developing nations and more recently the transitional
economies have modeled after one or some mixes of these forerunner systems
to establish their own kinds of state welfare structures.
Since the mid-1970s, however, governments of advanced capitalist
democracies have in varying degrees attempted to retrench the welfare state
(Swank 2001; Esping-Andersen 1996). Welfare states engaged in ―across-theboard cost cutting in response to a crisis of profitability in the capitalist
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economy‖ (Fabricant and Burghardt 1992, 29). These budget cuts and
consequent changes in the structure of social services have been
fundamentally linked to declining economy. With the emergence of the
economic crisis and the rise of the debtor state, access to and benefit levels of
entitlement programs have diminished (Fabricant and Burghardt 1992, 14).
Figure 1.1: Average social welfare spending among 18 Affluent Democracies

Figure 1.1 reports the change over time in average social welfare
spending using the Comparative Welfare States Dataset assembled by Huber,
Ragin, and Stephens in 1997 and later updated by Brady, Beckfield and
Stephens in 2004 (Huber et al. 2004). It is evident that the mean social welfare
spending as a percentage of GDP among 18 affluent democracies declined
precipitously since the early 1990s. For some countries, downward changes
were taking place since the 1980s. The United States in particular
maintained the lowest social welfare spending per GDP compared to other
advanced economies. The cost-containment policies have not only
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undermined the living situations of the poor people (Fabricant and Burghardt
1992) but also degraded global humanity as a whole (Mohan 1985; 2005).
Welfare states play a crucial role of managing economic risks,
distributing economic resources and institutionalizing equality (Brady, 2009a;
2009b). Even with gradually increased spending on social welfare between
1980 and 1992, the post-tax post-transfer poverty rate reversed the reduction
trend prior to this time (Calyton and Pontusson 1998). Economic changes in
more egalitarian Nordic welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s—i.e.,
declining employment—contributed to earnings inequality, which triggered
increased government redistribution (Kenworthy 2004).
Wage inequality has grown since 1980 due to the declining wage
bargaining and public sector restructuring along with various structural
factors—i.e., structural unemployment, immigration, changes in demand for
labor, slower growth of higher education, (Clayton and Pontusson 1998). In
countries where wage inequality was key to rising poverty and household
income inequality—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy—
welfare states were less generous thereby increasing post-tax post-transfer
income inequality (Kenworthy 2004).
Compared to other advanced welfare states, the United States has the
highest poverty rate and inequality at the beginning of the 21st Century
(Smeeding 2005; Brady 2009a; 2009b). Poverty is a significant structural
issue as it is deeply present in the United States, the world‘s richest nation
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(Brady 2009b; Rank 2004). Due to American institutions and lack of
spending effort, government policies and social spending produces much less
effect in the United States compared to any other advanced democracies
(Smeeding 2005).
Approximately 50 million or 20% of Americans are relatively deprived
and this figure may be as large as thrice the size of some Western European
countries (Brady 2009b). Even more striking is that the high risk of
experiencing poverty cuts across all age groups. A series of life-table
analyses conducted by Rank and Hirschl (2001) suggest that poverty is a real
issue that affects the lives of almost everyone in America. Their studies
revealed that about 66% of all Americans are expected to experience at least
a year in poverty by age 75 and that 37% of American adults will experience
extreme poverty (below 50% of the poverty line).
The magnitude and pervasiveness of the issue suggest the structural
nature of poverty. What is most striking is that 34% of all American
children—including 69% of African-American children and 63% of children
whose household head has less than 12 years of education—will experience
poverty before the age of 17 (Rank and Hirschl 1999). In 2006, about 17% of
all children (13 million) lived in families with below-poverty income (National
Center for Children in Poverty [NCCP], 2007b). Research suggests that
families need income of at least twice the federal poverty level (FPL) to take
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care of basic needs, but one finds that an additional 19% of children live in
families with 100% to 200% FPL income (NCCP 2007a).
The United States, to a large extent, exercises its post-Cold War
hegemonic power as a military and an economic leader. As an icon of
prosperity based on individual freedom and liberty, the United States‘ central
position within the international community triggers other nation-states to
emulate its policy choices. For example, welfare reform is already being
modeled by other Western European and developing countries as a way to
meet the financial challenges that governments have had to face since the
‗welfare state crisis‘ (Schelkle 1999). A ‗race to the bottom‘ as it applied to
the United States (Schram and Beer 1999) could lead to an international
pattern of moving toward lower benefits and stricter rules for welfare
provision (Mosley 2005).

1.3. Global vs. Local in the World-System
1.3.1. Globalization and Welfare State
Various schools of thought in international political economy—
liberalism, realism, and historical structuralism1—have over many years
developed theoretical arguments on the processes and effects of capitalism.
Especially after the fall of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, which signaled
the end of the Cold War, an agreement growingly emerged that capitalism‘s

The three main perspectives are not mutually exclusive ideologies and each contains a wide
variety of writings within (Cohn 2000).
1
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liberal market forces are being unleashed into the unclaimed prairies of open
global economy. This is the context in which this dissertation begins the
academic inquiry about what impact global capitalism has on the degree of
state authority in terms of protecting the welfare of its citizens domestically.
So long as welfare states remain an influential actor in this global arena, the
locally weak and rather underrepresented needs of its citizenry could avoid
marginalization by the whims and woes of the global market forces.
Globalization is often referred to as a market-induced process by which
changes take place in capital flows, production systems, markets and trade of
goods and services (Poole and Negi 2008). It is manifested by global changes
in economic structures and transnationlization of the world economy (George
and Wilding 2002). These processes involve the spatial reorganization of
production from advanced industrial to developing countries, the
interpenetration of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets,
decrease in transportation and communication costs, and the diffusion of
identical consumer goods to distant countries (Mittelman 1996; Yeates 1999).
Dominelli (1999) suggests that globalization not only promotes the
‗market discipline‘ but also affects all government activities, social welfare
systems, and human relationships. The main concern of globalization stated
by Cox (1996) is the loss of autonomous regulatory power by states. The
state‘s capacity of shielding domestic economies from negative effects of
globalization has diminished. Mittelman (1996) further adds that ‗in a
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globalized division of labor, the state no longer primarily initiates action in,
but reacts to, worldwide economic forces.‘ In order to realize material gain
from globalization, ‗the state increasingly facilitates this process, acting as its
agent.‘ While the curative measure offered to confront this has been more
globalization, no regulatory power at the level of global economy has been
provided (Cox 1996).
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) explain the theory behind welfare state
retrenchment that increased government spending on social welfare would
raise the labor costs, which in turn would decrease profitability. In addition,
when mobile capital will seek high-profit areas, it is inevitable that migration
of capital will take place from generous welfare states to other profit
maximizing areas. This process necessitates reform or the welfare states
have to suffer economic crisis. This efficiency perspective suggests that
globalization reduces political power and economic autonomy thereby causing
welfare state retrenchment (Blackmon 2006; Stiglitz 2006).
Many scholars have supported this position that global capitalism has
challenged the welfare states in their authority and capacity to protect the
common good against market failures at the global level (Deacon 2000;
Fabricant and Burghardt 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001; Mkandawire and
Rodriguez 2000; Mishra 1999; Nitzan 2001; Rieger and Leibfried 1998; Stoesz
and Lusk 1995; Strange 1996; Teeple 2000). However, this dominant view
has been contested by others who have maintained that globalization will
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have a positive effect on social spending, reflecting the increased need for
social protection (Garrett 1998; Kittel and Winner 2005).
In some recent studies, globalization was found to have a rather
curvilinear relationship with welfare state generosity (Brady et al. 2005;
Hicks 1999; Kim 2009; Rodrik 1997). Globalization has a differential effect
on the government social welfare effort—positive for less globalized countries
and negative for more globally integrated countries (Kim 2009). As
governments of developing nations are constrained more broadly by financial
market pressures than advanced nations (Mosley 2003), social welfare effort
will be enhanced by triggering economic development (Brady et al. 2005). For
already developed, mature welfare states, however, globalization causes
contractions.

1.3.2. Agent-Structure Relationships in a Global Society
In light of these mixed findings and arguments, having knowledge in
the linkages between the world economy and the national and local
economies, and the changes in such linkages, is indispensable to
understanding the social and political consequences within countries
(Keohane and Milner 1996). When it comes to understanding welfare states‘
adoption of social insurance legislation, Usui (1994) maintains that world
contextual factors contribute significantly by way of developing world-system
and global norms for state provision of social security.
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The world-system theorists define international system structures in
terms of ―the fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world
economy, which underlie and constitute states‖ (Wendt 1987). Thus,
capitalism has created a global economy that subsumes the economics of the
nation state (Wallerstein 1974). A world economy, according to Wallerstein
(1974), is an economic division of labor, which is overlaid by a multicentric
system of states. He further argues that capitalism, as a mode of production,
has always been imperialistic by constituting a hierarchical division of labor
between core areas and peripheral areas (Chase-Dunn 1981).
This categorization involves core areas being concentrated with
capital-intensive production that uses skilled and high-wage labor, while
peripheral areas contain mostly labor-intensive production that utilizes lowwage labor, which is often subject to extra-economic coercion. There is an
inherent relationship of exploitation between the developed and the less
developed world (Yearly 1996). Wallerstein (1974) believes that the
governments of developing nations need to understand the way the system
works and seize the chances created by the flow of global capital if they were
to prosper (Midgley 1997).
The nation state, based on this view, should no longer be treated as the
unit of analysis but the world in its totality. Barker (1978), cited by ChaseDunn (1981), in support of this, points out that the social system of
capitalism is not the state, but rather, the larger competitive state system. A
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global economy requires analyzing the world as an integrated system in
which economic forces flow according to the interests of capital. Wallerstein
(1974) shares this view as he emphasizes that the only meaningful unit of
analysis in comparative or international research of the global society is the
whole world-system.
Observing the twentieth-century state in the core of the modern worldsystem, Taylor (2003) contends that a state is a container of multiple
functions—i.e., waging war, managing economy, giving national identity, and
providing social services. The states‘ traditional territoriality that was used
to contain these functions has been challenged due to increasing
globalization. Against the end of the state thesis and the argument that this
container function might be leaking, he maintains that there is plenty of life
left in the container.
Wendt (1987) critiques the structural approach in world-system theory
by raising the question of ‗agent-structure problem,‘ which situates agents
and social structures in relation to one another. He suggests that human
agents and social structures are theoretically interdependent or mutually
implicating entities as he outlays two truisms about social life in which the
agent-structure problem has its origins. One is that human beings and their
organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or
transform the society in which they live; and the other that society is made
up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these
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purposeful actors. The problem in world-system theory, therefore, is that
there is no straightforward way to conceptualize these entities and their
relationships—the agent-structure relations.
World-system theorists‘ approach to the agent-structure problem is to
consider the world-system primitive and then to reduce state and class
agents to the effects of the reproduction requirements of capitalist worldsystem. Wendt (1987) questions the ability of the world-system theory to
explain the properties and causal powers of its primary units of analysis as
seriously undermining the potential explanations of state action. While
world-system theory provides important insights into examining the
structure and dynamics of global systems, it leaves serious weaknesses in the
theorization of the two basic building blocks on the global society—states and
international system structures.
Instead, Wendt (1987) proposes a structurationist approach to the
state system which views states in relational terms as generated or
constituted by internal relations of sovereignty and external spheres of
influence. The structuration theory suggests that states can be considered
goal-directed units of action or agents by definition. Wendt (1987, 356)
further states, ‗just as social structures are ontologically dependent upon and
therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the
causal powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are
constituted and therefore explained by structures.‘
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In other words, structuration theory conceptualizes agents and
structures as mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct entities where
each is in some sense an effect of the other. The two entities are codetermined where the social structures are the result of the intended and
unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose
or are mediated by an irreducible structural context.
The structures that constitute agents can be divided into two distinct
parts—external (social) structures and internal (organizational) structures—
where each explains a distinct set of the causal powers and interests of
agents. The external structure—the world economy in which states interact
with each other—affects the internal structure of state agents, according to
which states perform in the international stage. Through this process a new
external structure is formed which, again, cyclically returns to influence the
internal structure.
According to Wendt (1987), theories explaining global phenomena
must have foundations in theories of both their principal units of analysis—
state agents and system structure—because they are necessary when
explaining state action. The world-system theory, although it provides deep
insight into understanding globalization, only treats state and class agents as
no more than passive bearers of systemic imperatives. Contrarily, the
structuration theory emphasizes the importance of internal organizational
structures for explaining the subjectively perceived interests of agents since
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they condition their perceptions and responses to social structural
imperatives and opportunities. This theory will guide contextualization of
poverty in the global and local spheres as discussed in this dissertation.

1.3.3. Local Contexts in a Global Society
Social science knowledge has traditionally been locally focused and
pragmatic (Shahidullah 1998). Yearly (1996, 9) posits that ‗while claiming to
be the scientific study of society as an abstract entity, sociology has in
practice long acted as though society was only found in the form of nationstates.‘ As globalization is transforming the construction of social facts and
the formation of social discourses in societies worldwide, examining present
multidimensional social issues only within the bounds of nation-states will
have to be limited.
However, social science was not originally born to become a national
intellectual enterprise of a particular country. Rather, it was more local and
global in focus before the days of nation-state development.
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, Marx, Mills, Freud, Weber
and Durkheim of classical social science searched for
universals in understanding of human behavior and the
organization of human society. But in the wake of the rise of
social science in the nineteenth century, the old boundaries of
empires crumbled, a process of decolonization began, and
world societies began to be divided into nation-states. Social
science‘s growth and expansion, then, began primarily as a
part of national reconstruction and modernization in all the
world societies in the twentieth century (Shahidullah 1998,
173).
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Addressing the national and local concerns within the context of globalization
could form a theoretical framework that can help bridge the issues of
globality and locality (Harris and Chou 2001; Shahidullah 1998).
Could individuals act as an agent to the external structure or internal
structure affecting the state agent and the global external structure?
Arguably, it would be important to examine where the concept of the self
stand in the global society (Simpson 1996). The features of the modern self,
formulated by Mead (1934) is described as follows: ―… linking identity
formation and knowing, assimilating, absorbing subjectivity, the self is a
highly complex, organized, and unified reality that incorporates and
represents the social relations of which it is a part‖ (cited in Simpson 1996,
117).
As an acting unit, the self is the capacity to call forth the social
attitudes and social meanings that the individual‘s action call forth in others.
Mead (1934, 310) states that the social ideal and ultimate goal of human
social progress is:
…the attainment of a universal human society in which all
human individuals would possess a perfected social
intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be
similarly reflected in their respective individual
consciousness—such that the meaning of any on individual‘s
act or gestures … would be the same for any other individual …
who responded to them.
The viability of the Meadian self—that (1) the self is a natural unified
identity and (2) the referential representative nature of the self is constituted
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by social relations—is criticized by Simpson (1996) in the globalization
paradigm. First, the recursive self of Mead anchored in concrete face-to-face
primary and secondary relations cannot be produced at the global level. In
other words, it is impossible to be situated in a network of interpersonal
relations that encompasses everyone in the entire global society. Second, the
universal human society envisioned by Mead where all human beings would
possess a perfected social intelligence of common social meanings cannot be
feasible in the sense that it depends on the acquisition of interpretive codes
in common universal primary relations.
Therefore, no such unified common global society can exist for
individuals when the global Meadian self is rejected. However, Simpson
(1996, 199) notes, ‗the Meadian self of family, locale, neighborhood, and
community can be global actors in the sense that it can enter the global
circuitry as a unit with a partial but entirely representative presence.‘ It is
partial because of being formed in a limited milieu and representative
because it can present to the world the features of that milieu. In other
words, self realized in the local context rather than the global context.
Therefore, individuals are legitimate actors in a world of multi-level
actors that represent individuals. Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez (1997,
171) posit that the world society enjoys actors at several levels, each
demonstrating ‗appreciable legitimacy.‘ They go on to state:
Individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles of
citizenship, while individuals and international organizations do the
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same via principles of human rights. Between individuals and nationstates lie any number of interest and functional groups that have
standing as legitimated actors due to their connections with
individuals and states.
These functional groups can represent individuals as ―social actors and
structures such as new communities, cities, regions, and organization, which
will be essentially local in spirit but global in character‖ (Shahidullah 1998,
164). In this context, individuals entitled to demand equality and claim
primordial ethnic and familial rights (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez
1997).

1.4. Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge on poverty by
linking globalization, politics, welfare state, and poverty. Based on the
structuration theory, I outline the following multilevel conceptual map
illustrated in Figure 1.3. There are several proposed relationships to be
tested in the dissertation. First, globalization is the outer layer of the circle
that represents the external structure, and politics and social welfare
commitment are the nation level characteristics. While there are mixed
findings on the effects of globalization on welfare state and poverty, politics
has been known to significantly affect welfare generosity and poverty (Brady
2009a; 2009b). Little is known about how politics mediates the relationship
between globalization and welfare state and this dissertation fills this gap.
Figure 1.2: Multilevel Conceptual Map of Structural Effects on Poverty
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Second, poverty at the individual level may be a consequence reflecting
variations in the nation-level politics and social welfare commitment and
globalization. This type of inquiry requires conducting a multi-level analysis
and there is paucity of cross-national comparative work done on individual
poverty using a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique. This method
allows for modeling various dimensions of poverty (variables with different
units of analysis at both individual and structural levels) together in a single
analysis.
Only a few studies have examined individual and structural factors
together in the same model explaining individual level poverty (Brady 2009a;
Tai and Treas 2009). These two studies used a dichotomous dependent
variable (poor=1 or non-poor=0) and therefore used a generalized estimating
equations (GEE) method and a robust cluster analysis respectively. This
dissertation adds to these previous studies by including multi-dimensional
20

socio-politico-economic structural factors in the analyses using HLM. Using a
continuous poverty gap variable as the dependent variable, an HLM analysis
could be conducted. While this dissertation does not interpret the results
beyond the significance and the direction of the effects, the HLM allows for
the interpretation of the magnitude of effects, one of the key missing pieces in
these previous works mentioned above.
I follow Brady‘s (2009a) method and run a series of GEE models when
examining poverty status among the working age population in general and
then analyze poverty gap as the dependent variable for a sub-set of only those
who are poor in a series of linear mixed models. Poverty gap is a continuous
variable and therefore a PROC MIXED command can be used in SAS for an
HLM analysis. The main global and nation level structural variables
included in the study are: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation of the
poor; cumulative left party power; and union density]; (3) social welfare
commitment [welfare generosity; active labor market policies; and public
educational expenditure]; and (4) economic [unemployment rate]. The
relationships among these structural variables and on individual poverty
tested in this dissertation are illustrated in Figure 1.4.

Figure 1.3: Hypothesized Relationships of Structural Variables
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In order to explore the extent to which these hypothesized
relationships hold, a series of analyses at multilevel are conducted in this
dissertation. First, Chapter 2 starts with examining how socio-economic
development and political development are associated with social welfare
effort among 110 nation-states. This analysis was conducted to revisit some
of the traditional theories of welfare state comprehensively as they apply to a
cross-national dataset from 1980, the time point when the recent wave of
globalization begins its full course. Finding that socio-economic variables
predominantly explain the variations in social welfare effort, I then control
for these variables by narrowing the investigation only to 17 affluent
democracies on globalization, politics, and social welfare commitment
(depicted by thin arrows in Figure 1.3).
Second, in Chapter 3, I then examine the extent to which these
structural variables—socio-politico-economic factors—affect poverty at the
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aggregate level in 17 affluent democracies. The chapter introduces various
measures of poverty—particularly the head count percentage and the poverty
gap—and measures of politics and social welfare commitment that will be
used mainly for analyses in the dissertation. Based on the aggregate
country-level data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a series of
bivariate analyses are conducted to validate the hypothesized relationships
depicted by the thick arrows in Figure 1.3.
Third, Chapter 4 entertains the question of how local-level variables
affect poverty at the individual level. Using a nationally representative
dataset from the United States, I tested the traditionally dominant human
capital theory and labor force attachment perspective along with other
demographic variables. This relationship can be found in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Hypothesized Relationships of Individual-Level Variables
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Fourth, Chapter 5 combines Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4—therefore the
glocal perspective—to examine the effects of socio-politico-economic
structural factors, along with individual factors, on poverty at the individual
level in 17 affluent democracies. The LIS data is primarily used along with
structural variables adopted from the OECD data and the Comparative
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Welfare States Dataset (Huber et al. 2004). The model depicted in Figure 1.4
is tested for each country using LIS and then HLM is used in a combined
analysis using both the headcount poverty and poverty gap measures.
Fifth, in Chapter 6, I discuss poverty as the consequence of structural
dependence of politics. Poverty may be a naturally occurring consequence
within the capitalist economic system (Rank 2004), on which ideological
values and political decisionmaking processes have become structurally
dependent. The structural dependence of public will in dealing with
structural poverty leads to political inertia that supports the status quo.
Hence, what becomes marginalized is the structural definition of poverty and
the policy alternatives for systematically dealing with the issue of poverty.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with an overall summary of the
arguments based on empirical analyses and provides suggestions for research
looking to the future.
While many international social policy scholars tend to agree that
measures need to be taken to address the adverse effects of economic
globalization, the views are split between resolving the problems through
concerted global effort and emphasizing local activities (Ife 1998; Midgley
2001; Wagner 1997). Little institutional development has been made to
provide systematic and formal approaches to confront global social
problems— i.e. poverty and other human rights issues. The major social
justice concern is not that globalization is causing these phenomena, but that
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there is lack of government or state accountability in this newly emerged era
of global social welfare needs. While politics is the most important structural
variable that buffers these effects on individual poverty, a structurally
dependent political system may not have the power to be accountable to its
citizenry.
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Chapter 2. Global Perspective I: Welfare State Generosity
Chapter (Sections 1.1, 2.1-2.3) Published as:
Hong, P.Y.P. (2006). ―A cross-national comparison of welfare effort in an age
of welfare state retrenchment.‖ Journal of Comparative Social Welfare, 22(2):
125-142.

This chapter examines the extent to which socioeconomic and political
factors impact the degree of welfare effort in a period of welfare state crisis
and growing international interconnectedness. The question driving the
analysis is: What are some major determinants that have contributed to
greater welfare effort soon after the mid-1970s when the erosion of the
welfare state started occurring? What implications can one make taking into
account that welfare effort over the last 30 years has substantially decreased
as the economic interdependence among nation-state increased? This chapter
explores these questions using the 1980 cross section of the Indicators of
Social Development data in the beginning of welfare state retrenchment.
Then a series of bivariate analyses are conducted to examine them among
affluent democracies in order to control for the variations in socioeconomic
and political development.
As acknowledged by Baldwin (1990), there exists a tension between
socioeconomic and political explanations of welfare state development. In
this chapter, these two theoretical perspectives are tested to permit an
extensive reexamination of traditional studies of welfare state development.
First, a literature review of the two mainstream theoretical perspectives (i.e.
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socioeconomic and political perspectives) is conducted. Then, two models
based on variables suggested in these traditional perspectives are tested to
see which would have greater explanation in welfare effort of nation-states.
These two models are then integrated into a single model in order to observe
how together they explain welfare effort of nation-states. Although laying
emphasis on testing of theories imposes competition on theories (Mabbett and
Bolderson, 1999), this chapter suggests complementary measures to explain
welfare effort in a more complex globalized world-system.

2.1. Traditional Perspectives in Comparative Welfare State
Although the sum of all activities that promote human welfare may be
called social welfare effort (Midgley 1997, 68), this study primarily focuses on
the government involvement in social welfare to connote welfare effort or
what Wilensky et al. (1985, 5) referred to it as ―welfare-state effort‖.
According to Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 37), there is a group of studies
that used aggregate statistical data on government social expenditure to
measure social policy activity or welfare effort. These studies refer to welfare
effort as government expenditures on social programs—i.e., social security
spending as a fraction of the GNP or GDP (Esping-Andersen 1996; Castles
1996; Pryor 1968; Wilensky 1975) or per capita social security spending
(Aaron 1967; Peters 1972).
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While government spending could reflect the magnitude of allocation,
it is difficult to examine the comprehensiveness of a welfare state‘s legislative
commitment to various dimensions of social protection. As a clue to welfarestate development, Cutright (1965) relied on an index of social insurance
program experience indicated by the number of years a nation has had any of
five Guttman-scaled programs in operation. This included work injury,
sickness and/or maternity, old age, invalidism and death, family allowance,
and unemployment insurance. In a study of seventy-six nations, he revealed
that program experience was most strongly related to the level of
development. Also to support this, Flora and Alber (1987) and Usui (1994)
have included the year when key social legislation was implemented as a
proxy indicator of welfare effort.
Wilensky, Luebbert, Reed Hahn, and Jamieson (1985) offer a wide
spectrum of perspectives by which governments view their social policy
development. Social policy—in contrast to economic or environmental
policy—is a diffuse, residual category in some countries as broad as three
quarters of what governments do, in others as narrow as income maintenance
for the poor. As Aspalter (2006, 7) put it, ―there is no one indicator of
measuring it [social welfare] all‖. In this regard, Mabbett and Bolderson
(1999) argue that search for knowledge requires that theoretical propositions
be widely tested. International comparison allows propositions to be
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examined with reference to information obtained from many countries
(Aspalter 2006).
Therefore, conducting cross-national social policy analyses is important
in that it enhances knowledge about the welfare state development and
different social conditions of other countries (Midgley 1997). Major
contributions have been made by the field of comparative social policy studies
in terms of understanding the multiple dimensionality of social welfare
effort—having a wide range of interventions—and highlighting how social
welfare effort can be linked with key socio-economic outcomes (Mabbett and
Bolderson 1999). Wilensky et al. (1985, 4) identify three basic contributions
of comparative social policy research for top policymakers:
(1)

Improvement can be made in policy deliberations by a better
grasp of the degree to which welfare effort and program
development are constrained by distant social, economic and
historical factors and the degree to which social policy is a
matter of political choice.

(2)

By specifying broad policy options and program emphases
chosen by diverse countries confronting similar problems,
comparative social policy brings a wider range of policy options
to view.

(3)

Since comparative research uncovers the social, political and
economic consequences of different types of social policy and
levels of welfare effort, it can improve the policymakers‘
understanding of real opportunities and constraints.

2.1.1. Socioeconomic Perspectives of the Welfare State
The socioeconomic perspective of welfare effort emphasizes ―the impact
of economic growth and demographic and organizational/bureaucratic
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correlates‖ (Wilensky et al. 1985, 5). Usui (1994) also includes changes in
technological and social structure of a society as socioeconomic forces
affecting welfare state development. The convergence theory suggests that
economic development makes welfare states more identical in their approach
to providing social welfare. With economic growth, countries that vary in
terms of their cultures and political traditions grow closer in their strategy
for building the social safety net (Cutright 1965; Pryor 1968; Wilensky 1975).
In a later study on the development of social insurance, Kuhnle (1981) also
concluded that the timing of program adoption and the scope of legislation
(extent of government funding) were influenced by levels of economic
development.
Wilensky (1975) focused on economic development as the main
variable explaining the differences in social welfare effort cross-nationally
and over time. In his study of sixty-four nations, he found that welfare effort
varies by economic level. Also, his findings indicate that this relationship
depended highly on demographic and bureaucratic outcomes of affluence.
Consistently using GNP per capita as a proxy measure of economic
development, convergence theorists are on solid ground as they assert,
―programs to protect against basic risks of industrial life are primarily
responses to economic development and are independent of political factors‖
(Wilensky et al. 1985, 7-11).
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In contrast to sole economic explanations, a sociological diffusion
process views social policy initiatives primarily as the outcome of imitation,
whereby nations copy the efforts of welfare-state pioneers. Collier and
Messick (1975) suggest that innovations appear in the most advanced, largest
centers (modernized countries) and are then adopted by successively less
advanced or smaller units (non-modernized countries). They use the
percentage of labor force employed in agriculture to measure nonmodernization and the date of first program to measure welfare effort. The
reported findings seemed to indicate that a fairly strong tendency for
countries to adopt social welfare programs at progressively higher levels of
modernization. One could read this to understand that a hierarchical
diffusion process would consistently occur from more modernized to less
modernized countries. However, Collier and Messick (1975) report a rather
contradictory finding when they examined a subset of Western European
countries (Wilensky et al. 1985). The more modernized or advanced a
country was in the Western European context, the later it adopted a social
insurance scheme.
To suggest a little different approach to understanding modernization,
the concept can represent the degree of dehumanization (Mohan 1985; 1992;
1993; 1997) and the failure of voluntary provision to adequately address ―the
human costs of unmet social welfare needs that threaten to become social and
political costs‖ (Dixon and Scheurell 2002, 233). Modernization may mean
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various aspects of economic, social, and political advancements (Germani
1981) and they are associated with the process of Great Transformation
(Polayni 1957)—i.e., social differentiation, individuation and individualism,
market / scientific growth, autonomization, social / organizational
innovations, etc.
This is in line with the basic thesis asserting, ―welfare state is a
product of the needs generated by the development of industrial societies‖
(Pierson 1991, 16). Germani (1981, 52) provides urbanization as an
amalgamation of social traits that are attributed to industrial societies,
commonly characterized by ―opposing traditional (or sacred) to modern (or
secular) society.‖ He assembled 36 indicators of economic, social, and
political modernization and found them to be high correlated with
urbanization (Ibid, 74).

2.1.2. Political Perspectives of the Welfare State
According to Usui (1994, 255-56), there are two camps of thought
within the political perspectives on welfare state development. One
emphasizes the societal political forces as critical to welfare state
development—i.e., working-class political mobilization; strength of unions;
mass party organizations; electoral turnout; and government characteristics.
She categorizes these societal political forces into two groups: (1) the classbased interests and (2) non-class-based, demographically connected interests.
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The class-based interests demand state-sponsored benefits as supported by
the working-class strength theory (Shalev 1983) and power resource theory
(Korpi 1989). A non-class-based interest demand from diverse groups of
citizens in contemporary society can also affect government action through
electoral participation.
The second stream of thought within the political perspectives
emphasizes government related factors—i.e., government representatives,
politicians, and political parties. These researchers maintain that ―it is not
just class-based political struggles but also government administrators that
affect welfare state development‖ (Usui 1994, 256). It is in the self-interest of
government officials to represent the societal interest in order to gain
electoral support. Government representatives therefore mediate the
relationship between societal interests and government social welfare
policies.
Another political perspective on different levels of welfare effort
focuses on government ideologies in terms of attitudes about more or less
planning for equality (Castles 1978a). Coughlin (1980) asserts that a
country‘s mix of economic collectivism and economic individualism will match
its social spending and taxing and the actual amount of government
intervention. Castles (1978a) argues that ideology is a crucial variable in
explaining differences in welfare effort. His concept of ideology is defined
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through the degree to which parties and party systems agree on promoting
egalitarian policies.
Castles introduced two alternative variables as indicators of ―pure
welfare‖—education expenditures as a percentage of GNP and deaths in the
first year per 1,000 live births. He asserted that over the long term,
education spending would redistribute income-earning potential. Also, he
contended that infant mortality should be seen as an index of society‘s care
for the weak. However, Wilensky (1975) rejected the idea of including
education expenditures as a measure of egalitarian ideology. He asserted
that education at higher levels and among better institutions may have
effects that are regressive rather than egalitarian. He further criticized
Castles for including infant mortality because the measure is influenced by
outcomes that are only partly attributable to policy (Wilensky et al. 1985).
Therefore, it was later agreed upon that these two variables do not
adequately represent the political perspective explaining the variation in
welfare effort.
Based on the study of Scandinavian countries, Castles (1978b) argued
that high levels of welfare effort were associated with left dominance in the
party system. Left parties, according to Wilensky et al. (1985), are defined by
broad ideological stance: any party with a major commitment to using the
state apparatus to redistribute national income toward lower strata that has
historically advocated increased economic, political and social equality.
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In attempting to isolate the role of parties and electoral competition,
Heclo (1974) focuses on the function of parties in democratic societies: parties
offer distinct choices; voters make distinct choices; and parties in government
have a mandate to implement the choices. In support of this view, Gastil
(1996/1997) contends that electoral democracies offer the best climate in
which basic freedoms can thrive. Moreover, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990)
introduce a position that political democracy operates to reduce distributional
inequalities.
2.1.3. An Integrated Perspective
While Wilensky particularly emphasized socioeconomic factors
contributing to the variations in social welfare effort across countries, other
researchers highlighted political factors as being key to impacting social
welfare effort (Castles 1978a; Heclo 1974; Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and
Inkeles 1990). These two streams of thoughts have been tested through
continuous research activities from which new explanations continued to be
added. Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) cite the role of religion (Wilensky et al.
1985; Castles 1994), and the structure and size of the state (Huber, Ragin,
and Stephens 1993). Along these lines of effort, Wilensky came to develop ―a
further model which combines the influence of industrialization (convergence)
and politics (divergence) and includes the role of democratic corporatism and
the power of mass-based Catholic and ‗left‘ political parties‖ (Mabbett and
Bolderson 1999, 43).
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2.2. Traditional Comparative Cross-National Analysis
2.2.1. Research Question and Model
The first part of this chapter explores the different effects that the two
traditional theoretical perspectives and an integrated model have on nationstates‘ welfare effort, as have been previously documented in different
literatures. First, the socioeconomic perspective (Model 1) included GNP per
capita (Wilensky 1975) as a proxy for economic development and
modernization (Collier and Messick 1975) for unmet social welfare needs
accompanied by urban industrialization. Second, considering that no
information on the ideology, type of government, power of labor, or party
representation were available in this dataset, the political perspective (Model
2) could only include freedom (Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) as
a measure of political rights and civil liberty that the nation-states provide
for its people. Third, after examining these two models independently of each
other, the integrated model (Model 3), which combines both socioeconomic
and political perspectives, is examined as to how they affect welfare effort
(Cutright 1965; Flora and Alber 1987).
Revisiting the traditional theoretical perspectives, it is hypothesized
that both socioeconomic and political models significantly affect welfare effort
in separate analyses. However, it is further hypothesized that the integrated
model has a significant relationship with welfare effort of a country. This

36

exploratory study is not intended for preferring a particular model to the
other. Rather, the main focus is to validate the traditional knowledge on how
different measures account for welfare effort across nations in order to
pursue a complementary and broader explanation of welfare effort in the
advent of a more complex globalized world-system.
In order to test these hypotheses, a multiple regression or an ordinary
least square (OLS) regression analysis was employed. OLS is eminently
suited for analyzing collective and separate effects of two or more
independent variables on a dependent variable‖ (Mabbett and Bolderson
1999, 3). Particularly in explanatory research, it is useful for taking
information from independent variables to explain the variability of a
dependent variable (Ibid, 5). Also, OLS is noted as one of the main
methodological features of comparative social welfare research (Ibid, 41). As
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 44) contend, ―the convergence theory was most
strongly supported when the data were drawn from countries across a wide
range of levels of economic development.‖ In this regard, this dataset was
found to be particularly appropriate for testing the expected relationship
between welfare effort and GNP per capita as a proxy for economic growth.

2.2.2. Data and Analysis
This study is based on a secondary analysis of the Indicators of Social
Development 1970-83 data, which is a collection of data from the World
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Bank, United Nations organizations and other internationally based
organizations (Estes 1988; 1997). The key source of information for this
country-level data is the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI)
series. Also included are data from external agencies, such as the UN‘s
Human Development Report, UN HABITAT, EIU, and ICRG among others.
The Indicators of Social Development provide a snapshot of a country‘s
or region‘s social development that is a useful starting point for more detailed
analytical work. By making social development issues comparable across
countries and regions, the indicators provide cross-country evaluations of
development effectiveness. The indicators are organized into four sections,
starting with the country context, which provides background information on
each country, and the three conceptual dimensions of the social development
strategy—inclusion, cohesion, and accountability. Information gathered in
the dataset reflects the time in which governments of advanced capitalist
democracies have in varying degrees attempted to retrench the welfare state
in response to declining economy.
A cross-sectional analysis using selected variables for the year 1980
from the dataset is conducted on 110 countries. When a set of data consists
of a high percentage of missing values, it may be difficult if not impossible to
make interpretations of the results and to draw correct conclusions. In other
words, missing values could be a threat to generalizability of results. The
Indicators of Social Development 1970-83 data presented this problem having
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as many as 82 cases out of 192 total missing values for the dependent
variable. The frequencies of missing data for each independent variable were
68 for GNP per capita, 0 for modernization, and 68 for freedom. A closer
physical examination of these 82 missing cases revealed a systematic pattern
such that they were disproportionately among ‗least developed‘ or ‗developing‘
country categories—i.e., Angola, Belize, Botswana, North Korea, Sudan, etc.
Governments of these countries have consistently failed to contribute their
data on many of these variables to the World Bank and/or the UN‘s Human
Development Report (UNDP 1998).
The fact that welfare effort is defined in this data based on the number
of years since first social policy legislations were implemented could possibly
speak to the major reason why these countries might be missing this
information. Midgley (1997, 68) suggests that welfare effort in this sense is
called ―statutory‖ or government involvement in social welfare, which could
be neglecting other forms of social services that may exist in these countries.
Missing data could denote nonexistence of government social policies or
perhaps lack of systematic government data management system. These
missing cases are omitted from the analysis rather than loosely imputing any
values (i.e., predicted or mean values). Therefore, generalization of the
findings should only be applied to those countries that have had any
government-sponsored welfare effort in place.
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2.2.3. Social Welfare Effort
The dependent variable of interest is the welfare effort sub-index,
which is a component of the Index of Social Progress (ISP). Richard J. Estes
(1997) from the University of Pennsylvania has developed an ISP for the
purpose of identifying significant changes in ‗adequacy of social provision‘
and to assess the progress in providing more adequately for the basic social
and material needs of the world‘s population. The ISP consists of 46 social
indicators that have been subdivided into 10 subindexes: education, health
status, women status, defense effort, economic, demography, geography,
political participation, cultural diversity, and welfare effort. All 46 indicators
are known to be valid indicators of social development.
The welfare effort sub-index is a composite measure comprising five
variables measuring the number of years from 1980 since the ―First Law‖
was implemented to protect income loss resulting from (1) old age, invalidity,
death; (2) sickness and maternity; (3) work injury; (4) unemployment and (5)
cash payments to families with children (USDHHS 1990). First Law is
defined as the first consolidated compulsory legislation extending protection
against a specific risk to a substantial segment of the salaried labor force on
an industry-wide or nation-wide basis.
The weights used to construct the index were derived through a twostage varimax factor analysis in which each indicator and subindex was
analyzed for its relative contribution toward explaining the variance
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associated with changes in social progress over time (Sharpe 1999).
Standardized subindex scores were then multiplied by the factor loadings to
create weighted subindex scores and the Composite Weighted Index of Social
Progress (WISP) scores were obtained through a summation of the weighted
subindex scores. Estes argues that the WISP is a more comprehensive, valid,
reliable instrument for assessing changes in social development over time
than other indices on national and international progress like GDP and the
HDI. Estes (1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1997) has provided estimates for 124
countries for 1970, 1980, and 1990.
When observing the data, Denmark with the highest welfare sub-index
value of 29 had its age law passed in 1891, sick law in 1892, injury law in
1898, work law in 1907 and family law in 1952. In other words, the welfare
sub-index score of 29 was the highest ranking score among all countries.
Germany, which also scored 29 on the welfare sub-index, reported to have
passed the age law in 1889, sick law in 1883, injury law in 1884, work law in
1927 and family law in 1954. Both of these countries had 360 total years to
1980 since all five categories of laws were passed. Theoretically, welfare
effort was bounded at the lower end by 0 (for those countries that did not
have any of these laws implemented) and was unbounded at the upper end.
Total observation was 110, empirically bounded by 1 at the lower end and 29
at the upper end (see Table 1). The mean value of this variable was 11.47
and the standard deviation was 7.95.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive summary of variables
Variables

Obs

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Welfare effort

110

11.47

9.00

7.95

1.00

29.00

GNP per capita

110

3131.46

1285.00

3966.41

110.00

16440.00

GNP log

110

7.21

7.16

1.37

4.70

9.71

Modernization

110

46.93

48.00

24.87

0.00

100.00

Free

110

.31

0.00

.46

0.00

1.00

Part free

110

.34

0.00

.47

0.00

1.00

Europe

110

.25

0.00

.43

0.00

1.00

2.2.4. Socioeconomic Variables
Socioeconomic variables represent the economic and social
characteristics that accompany industrialization. GNP per capita was
selected as a proxy for economic development. It is a continuous independent
variable, expressed in US dollars, that measures the total domestic and
foreign output claimed by each resident of a country. It comprises gross
domestic product (GDP) adjusted by net factor income from abroad, which
includes income for factor services (labor, investment and interest). It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation.
GNP per capita is theoretically bounded at the lower end by US$ 0 and
unbounded at the upper end. A univariate analysis indicated that there were
110 observations (see Table 1). The empirical range for GNP per capita was
US$ 16,330, bounded by US$ 110 at the lower end and US$ 16,440 at the
upper end. The mean value of this variable was US$ 3131.46 (standard
deviation=3,966.41) with the median value of US$ 1,285. This variable,
however, violated the linearity assumption for Classical Linear Regression
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Model (CLRM), suggesting the need for a log transformation. The
transformed log GNP per capita ranged from 4.70 to 9.71 with the mean
value of 7.21 (standard deviation=1.37).
Modernization was chosen to reflect the social consequence of unmet
social welfare needs based on the extent to which a country is urban
industrialized. It is a continuous independent variable that measures the
percentage of urban population in total population. The calculation involved
dividing the percentage of population living in areas termed urban of a
particular country by the sum of percentage of those living in rural and urban
areas. Modernization is theoretically bounded at the lower end by 0 percent
and 100 percent at the upper end. There were 108 observations in this
variable whose observed range was 0 percent at the lower end and 100
percent at the upper end (see Table 1). The mean value was 48 percent
(standard deviation=.24) and the median was 48 percent.

2.2.5. Political Variable
Freedom was selected to represent the political climate of a country. It
is a polychotomous variable that reflects a composite rating based on national
averages attained on the Civil Liberties and Political Rights Indexes. Gastil
(1996/1997) defines freedom as right of all adults to vote and compete for
public office, and for public office, and for elected representatives to have a
decisive vote on public policies. Freedom is a broad concept that encompasses
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two sets of characteristics grouped under political rights and civil liberties.
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process.
Civil liberties are the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal
autonomy apart from the state. Countries are rated as either 1 for ―free‖; 2
for ―partly free‖; and 3 for ―not free‖. A total of 110 observations were found
with 30.28 percent of the countries reporting as ―free‖ (n=34), 33.94 percent
―partly free‖ (n=37) and 35.78 percent ―not free‖ (n=39). Then, this variable
was dummy coded with not free being the reference group.

2.2.6. Control Variable
One of the CLRM assumptions is that there is no autocorrelation
between the disturbances, having no disturbance ui and uj correlated with
each other. The data used for this study being a cross-sectional data, a
spatial autocorrelation among countries closely located geographically could
possibly exist in this dataset. This would mean that the estimated residuals
may exhibit a systematic pattern associated with the regional differences.
Once detected, this would need to be taken out of the data. After sorting
welfare effort in the descending order and examining the pattern, a
possibility of spatial autocorrelation among European countries scoring
higher in the welfare sub-index than countries of other regions. A new
dummy variable was created whereby the value of 1 was assigned for
European (n=27) and 0 for non-European countries (n=83). Once this
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variable was entered into each model to control for spatial autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity found in the error terms disappeared as well.

2.2.7. Findings
To provide a summary of key findings, first, the OLS results from the
socioeconomic and political models were found to be significant when
examined separately. From the socioeconomic model, one can understand
that countries that have greater potential unmet social needs of the modern
world represented by the level of urbanization have greater welfare effort.
Also, in the political model, countries that enjoy greater freedom have greater
welfare effort. Second, in an integrated model, the combined effect was
significant in the model but with only modernization remaining as a
significant variable. Controlling for all other variables, unmet social needs in
modern urbanized countries influence governments‘ decision to implement
social protection schemes. Detailed findings by each step are provided in the
following:
A multiple regression analysis of the socioeconomic model was
conducted, in which welfare effort was regressed on the log of GNP per capita,
modernization, and Europe. The socioeconomic model (Model 1) was
significant [F(3,106)=122.86; p=.0000] explaining about 78 percent (R2=.7766)
of the variance in welfare effort (see Table 2). The adjusted R2, corrected for
sample size and number of independent variables, was .7703. Modernization
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(b=.05, t=2.22, p=.028) had a partial slope significantly affecting the model
while the log of GNP per capita was not found to be statistically significant.
An increase of 1 percentage point in modernization was associated with an
average welfare sub-index score rise of .05 when the log of GNP per capita
and Europe was held constant.

Table 2.2: Multivariate Regression Analyses of Welfare Effort
Theoretical
Perspectives

Variables

Socioeconomic

GNP per capita
Modernization

Political

Free
Partly free

Control variable

Europe
Constant

N
R2
Adjusted R2

Model 1
β̂

.95
.05

(se( β̂ ))

Model 2
Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ )) Sig.

(.54)
(.02) *

-.87 (2.99)
110
.78
.77

β̂

(se( β̂ ))

.87
.05
2.17 (1.08) *
.73 (.99)

12.13 (1.19) ***

Model 3

**
*
**
6.95 (.71)
*
110
.72
.72

14.68 (1.09)

Sig.

(.57)
(.02) *

.51 (1.05)
-.28 (.92)
11.89 (1.26) ***
-.38 (3.11)
110
.78
.77

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The political model (Model 2) was significant [F(3,106)=92.25; p=.0000]
with about 72 percent (R2=.7230) of the variance in welfare effort explained.
The adjusted R2 was .7152. The independent variable—freedom (b=2.17,
t=2.01, p=.047)—had a partial slope significantly affecting the model when
controlling for part free and Europe. The mean welfare effort goes up by 2.17
points as one moves from not free to free countries. The integrated model
(Model 3) was significant [F(5,104)=72.80; p=.0000] explaining about 78
percent (R2=.7778) of the variance in welfare effort with the adjusted R2 of
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.7671. One socioeconomic independent variable—modernization (b=.05,
t=2.26, p=.026)—had its partial slope significantly affecting the model. One
percentage points increase in modernization was associated with an average
welfare sub-index rise of .05 when other independent variables were held
constant.
Findings suggest that both socioeconomic and political models are
significant. This supports the first hypothesis that both models are
significant when examined in separate models. When comparing the amount
of variance explained, there is a difference of only about 6 percent between
the two models—the socioeconomic model explaining about 78 percent and
the political model about 72 percent of the variance in welfare effort. The
results seemed to be in line with both theoretical perspectives when observed
separately. The integrated model was significant as well, which confirmed
the second hypothesis. However, only one variable from the socioeconomic
perspective was significantly affecting the model.
One might conclude that these findings reconfirm Wilensky‘s (1975)
argument that welfare effort would ‗converge‘ in the course of economic
development rather than ideologically develop by political variations (Castles
1978a; Heclo 1974; Gastil 1996/1997; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990). However,
this chapter remains distant from simplistically taking positions favoring one
particular model. Rather, I suggest some ways to improve the enterprise of
comparative social policy research after revisiting the traditional approach.
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2.3.

Critique of the Traditional Approach
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999) suggested that there is no agreement on

the extent to which social democracy, policy maturity, economic growth or
population aging affect the level of social welfare effort. Although
substantive findings were gathered by comparing social welfare effort, on the
whole, large-scale regression analyses could not provide any answers to
resolving these theoretical debates (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999). Amenta
(1993) attributes this partly to not having good empirical measures for some
key theoretical concepts and therefore not adequately representing
theoretical propositions. Next, particularities of the domestic contexts
challenge the goodness-of-fit of the regression models when applying the
common factors in cross-national analyses (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999).
Lastly, there are problems with taking a uni-dimensional view of welfare
effort while many different aspects configure the whole of social policy effort
of nation-states.
What the chapter argues for is the need to acknowledge the past
limitations of conducting comparative social policy research and to develop a
new set of cross-national measures and methods to meet the changes that are
occurring at the global level. As mentioned in an earlier section, first,
documentation of more political variables—i.e., ideological tendencies of
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ruling parties, length of a particular party in power, power of labor, etc.—
could further improve model specifications using the political perspective.
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999, 42) suggested that a single coefficient
and measure of significance generated for all the observations of each
variable included requires an assumption that ―the independent variables
have the same effect on the dependent variable across countries‖ in crosssectional analyses. This assumption may not be met in models that include
political variables since not all governments are democratic in nature.
Perhaps the political dimension is more applicable when examining
the variations among countries with democratic governments. The major
reason why the political perspective had less explanation in this study seems
to be because it was originally developed from studies of Scandinavian
countries to investigate divergence among highly industrialized countries
whose socioeconomic factors would be similar. Therefore, applying it to other
parts of the world would be a threat to its validity as would be the case in this
data, which were drawn from countries across a wide range of levels of
economic development. Industrialized countries are unquestionably more
likely to have greater economic capacity with longer history of building their
economy which in turn may have necessitated the institutionalization and
implementation of social policies long before less developed countries.
Supported by De Swaan (1994) and Deacon (1997), Mabbett and
Bolderson (1999) introduced a new convergence theory that all market

49

economies are subject to competitive constraints on state welfare activity
suggesting severe limits to comparative social policy analysis in today‘s
world. This challenges the lack of a well-defined dependent variable.
Welfare effort as a measure of years count since the First Law and rank
ordering them using a composite welfare sub-index fails to capture the nature
and the total quantity of welfare effort. While comparative studies on
welfare states have primarily dealt with government social welfare programs,
it is now recognized that more attention needs to be given to non-statutory
provisions. A multi-dimensional analysis of welfare effort requires different
methodological approaches. Cochrane and Clarke (1993) assert that the
study of welfare effort comparison should be conducted within the context of
changed relationship of each country to the international economy.
Conducting comparative social policy research is not a straightforward
matter. It is characterized by complex methodological difficulties that limit
development of broad, scientifically accurate theories. Two of the
mainstream theories in comparing welfare effort cross-nationally have been
examined. Then, an integrated model that included both socioeconomic and
political perspectives has been examined to further investigate where
previous discrepancy existed in attempts to explain welfare effort in an
international context. Modernization as a proxy for socially unmet needs in
the midst of the stresses of urban industrialized environment is a strong
predictor of welfare effort.
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Although this analysis seemed to verify the extent to which both
socioeconomic and political perspectives predict welfare effort, little is said
about how they complement each other. Perhaps, modernization with its
political dimension (Pierson, 1991) may have taken out the effect of freedom
in the integrated model. Examination of the current world trends and
limitations in the past comparative social policy studies suggests that
exploring modernization as a concept that encompasses all aspects of
economic, social and political spheres of human need.

2.4.

Comparison of Welfare States in the Global Context
As Keohane and Milner (1996) point out, no longer can one understand

politics within countries without comprehending the nature of the linkages
between national economies and the world economy, and the changes in such
linkages. As countries become more integrated into the world economy, state
welfare effort becomes challenged when countries try to stay competitive in
the world market. This calls for understanding welfare effort in the context
of increased local governmental and non-governmental participation and
global efforts by international organizations to promote social rights of all
people.
Globalization, which is a process defined by Midgley (1997, xi) as
―global integration in which diverse peoples, economies, cultures and political
processes are increasingly subjected to international influences,‖ has become
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increasingly important features of modern life. Government social policies
are not exceptions to being influenced by these global forces of change.
Socioeconomic and political changes that a nation-state might experience in
relation with other countries directly and indirectly influence today‘s social
policies at the domestic level (Deacon 1997).
The causes of many social issues not necessarily being confined to
national institutions and structures (Yeates 2005), the new global realities
call for internationalizing of social problems and public policies, and
universalizing of knowledge (Mohan 2003; 2005). Therefore, a cross-national
comparison in this context can be an effective means for identifying key
factors that explain the nation-state variations on welfare effort. Newly
developed knowledge through comparative social welfare could ―lay the
ground stone for a better tomorrow‖ by exporting ideas from one part of the
world to another (Aspalter 2006, 4, 14).

2.4.1. Globalization, Politics and Welfare State
This section explores a wider range of variables that reflect the
dynamics of change in welfare provision due to global economic factors. I
restrict the analyses to 18 affluent democracies in order to control for
variations in socio-economic and political variables examined in the
traditional approach. This allows for investigation of other domestic
variables that could better capture how countries are internally organized to
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affect welfare effort. Deeper examination of internal economic and political
variations is particularly important in an era of globalization when less
macro-socioeconomic differences would be observed beyond borders,
especially among the 18 affluent democracies.
Iversen and Cusack (2000) uses a sample of 16 Western industrialized
nations to set forth an economic analysis of welfare state expansion. Their
theorizing effort challenges the two major theoretical perspectives—that (1)
globalization weakens welfare states and (2) globalization triggers strong leftlabor power to stimulate welfare state growth. Their economic analysis
involves reexamining the risks induced by de-industrialization:
Most of the risks being generated in modern industrialized societies
are the product of technologically induced structural transformations
inside national labor markets. Increasing productivity, changing
consumption patterns, and saturated demand for products from the
traditional sectors of the economy are the main forces of change.
These structural sources of risks are identified as the factors that stimulate
demands for state compensation and risk sharing. They conclude that the
severity of internally driven employment losses in the traditional sectors
affects the degree of transfers and government consumption.
They refer to the explanatory variable in this relationship as
deindustrialization, which is defined as ―100 minus the sum of
manufacturing and agricultural employment as a percentage of the workingage population‖ (Ibid, 331-32). This is a substantial departure from the
traditional convergence theory that posits industrialization measured in
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terms of economic growth is directly and linearly related to upward
convergence toward welfare state development. Instead, Iversen and Cusack
introduces the internal sectoral shift in labor market participation as a
different economic variable to explain welfare state commitment.
They also hypothesized that ―partisan governments and organized
interests are expected to shape social policies in order to benefit the
distributive interests of their own constituencies‖ (Ibid, 328). Therefore,
where unions are strong and centrally organized and where left government
has been dominant, the welfare state is expected to assume a more
redistributive form. They confirm the hypothesis with significant results
using left government, electoral participation, and strength of labor added to
economic variables. The path analysis results indicate that through various
channels these political variables tend to mediate the relationship between
deindustrialization and welfare state commitment.
The central thesis proposed by Esping-Andersen‘s (1990, 1, 30)
historical coalitional analysis is that ―the history of political class coalitions is
the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations.‖ In this sense, this model
supports a direct impact of social groups on the shaping of welfare state
regime types—liberal, conservative, and social democratic. For instance, in
Nordic countries, a broad red-green alliance was the necessary condition for a
―full-employment of welfare state in return for farm-price subsidies‖ (Ibid,
30). As the author sees that social classes are the main agents of change, the
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balance of class power would determine distributional outcomes (Ibid, 16)
characterized by the types of welfare state regimes, which would
subsequently determine the degree of welfare state commitment.
The author identifies three independent variables that interactively
explain the extent to which welfare state commitment varies: (1) the pattern
of working-class political formation; (2) political coalition-building in the
transition from rural economy to a middle-class society; and (3) past reforms
contributing to institutionalization of class preferences and political behavior
(Ibid, 32). The class coalitions, which Esping-Andersen (Ibid, 33) points to
having affected the foundation of three welfare state regime types, ―explain
not only their past evolution but also their future prospects for welfare
commitment.‖ He supports his propositions with historical accounts of class
coalition to generate political behaviors that contributed to the development
of varying types of welfare states.
Notermans‘s (1993, 136) institutional analysis brings to light that ―the
demise of full-employment policies reflects the institutional inability of
present-day market economies to contain inflationary pressures.‖ The
independent variable examined is the institutional ability to contain
inflation, which causally influences welfare state commitment. Using the
cases of Norway and Sweden, Notermans (1993, 153) asked why even in
Social Democratic countries, a switch was made to a restrictive
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macroeconomic regime, which sacrificed growth and employment in an effort
to reduce inflation.
The author is convinced that ―the historical task Social Democracy
performed in the thirties was not to establish full employment as the first
priority of economic policies but to halt a disruptive deflation‖ (Ibid, 156).
And, therefore, this institutional arrangement would not have survived much
longer if both Norway and Sweden had not found an effective way of keeping
inflation in check during the fifties and sixties. In fact, Labor is essentially
excluded from macroeconomic policy-making in a regime, which gives
preference to external balance (Ibid, 134). Also, there is a mention of weaker
links between the trade unions and the conservative governments of the first
half of the 1980s in Norway, which might have partly played a role in shying
away from incomes policies (Ibid, 149).

2.4.2. Analysis and Findings
Eighteen affluent democracies are examined comparatively using
Scruggs‘s (2005) Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset. These
countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This data
set provides systematic data on institutional features of social insurance
programs spanning much of the post-war period. The welfare generosity

56

variable was extracted for each country for three time points—1980, 1990,
and 2000.
Merged with this data set was the Comparative Welfare States (Huber
et al. 2004), which provided variables for cumulative left party dominance for
the three time periods. KOF Index of Globalization2 was also included in the
analysis (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008). This composite
index includes economic globalization (characterized as long distance flows of
goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that
accompany market exchanges); political globalization (characterized by a
diffusion of government policies); and social globalization (expressed as the
spread of ideas, information, images and people). In order to explore the
effect of internal economic condition, the percentage of service sector civilian
workers was extracted from the OECD statistical data and included to reflect
de-industrialization.

Figure 2.1: Average Welfare Generosity over Time

The KOF Index of Globalization was introduced in 2002 (Dreher 2006) and is updated and
described in detail in Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008). Following Clark (2000), Norris
(2000) and Keohane and Nye (2000), it defines globalization to be the process of creating
networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a
variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods. Globalization is
conceptualized as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates national economies,
cultures, technologies and governance and produces complex relations of mutual
interdependence.
2
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Figure 2.1 shows welfare generosity increasing on average until about
the mid-1980s. Then, the trend gradually decreases. Welfare generosity is
particularly low and stagnant in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Figure 2.2: Average Globalization over Time

Figure 2.2 shows average globalization score increasing over time and
this trend is quite consistent among all countries observed although there are
variations on the rate of change.
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Figure 2.3: Average Cumulative Left Party Dominance over Time

Figure 2.3 describes the change over time on the average cumulative
left party power. While most countries display an increasing trend in left
party power, Canada, Japan, and the United States have no left party
activity at all.
Figure 2.4: Average Percentage of Service Sector Workforce over Time

Figure 2.4 depicts the increasing trend of the average percentage of
civilian workforce working in the service sector over time. The overall change
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between 1970 and 2000 is nearly 20 percentage points, a huge change in the
makeup of the economy in industrialized nations. Most of these affluent
democracies seem to be undergoing de-industrialization.
Table 2.3 lists the country-level data for four variables in consideration
at three time points: 1980, 1990, and 2000. For each year, a series of
bivariate regression analyses are conducted considering the small sample
size. Left party power and service workforce are regressed on each other and
on globalization. Then, welfare generosity is regressed on globalization, left
party power, and service workforce.
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Table 2.3: Description of Globalization, Left Party Power, Service Workforce, and Welfare Generosity
Countries

1980
Globaliza- Left party
Welfare
Service %
tion
power
generosity

1990
Globaliza- Left party
Welfare
Service %
tion
power
generosity

2000
Globaliza- Left party
Welfare
Service %
tion
power
generosity

Australia

64.77

6.94

62.62

19.30

75.16

14.77

69.04

19.80

82.64

19.94

73.41

18.40

Austria

72.97

20.45

49.22

27.80

77.73

28.06

55.19

27.40

91.70

33.38

63.58

28.93

Belgium

72.80

11.98

62.13

31.30

82.72

13.74

68.97

32.50

93.38

18.98

71.91

32.61

Canada

80.97

0.00

66.19

21.20

79.79

0.00

71.41

24.80

89.88

0.00

74.16

25.45

Denmark

70.76

23.72

62.55

37.20

75.86

25.39

66.91

36.30

90.52

32.18

70.21

35.44

Finland

60.94

14.20

51.81

27.40

66.94

19.14

60.69

34.40

88.15

22.93

66.30

30.72

France

64.91

3.09

55.67

30.30

74.83

10.34

64.63

31.90

85.55

16.17

73.96

27.96

Germany

57.80

10.89

51.01

29.10

61.43

12.31

57.95

27.90

83.61

0.00

63.69

27.51

Ireland

74.41

3.12

49.17

21.20

74.40

4.20

56.08

21.00

87.01

5.98

63.51

26.93

Italy

53.00

2.60

47.83

17.80

65.02

4.66

58.80

21.30

81.31

8.56

62.22

26.73

Japan

42.57

0.40

54.24

17.40

48.12

0.40

58.71

17.70

60.56

1.37

63.71

20.39

Netherlands

83.43

8.36

63.64

35.90

83.72

9.22

69.13

35.40

92.23

13.66

76.75

35.77

New Zealand

62.55

9.92

55.30

26.20

67.42

16.25

66.25

27.90

81.27

17.33

68.12

23.70

Norway

71.03

28.50

61.87

38.40

76.31

32.88

68.72

41.10

85.05

40.54

73.95

41.56

Sweden

73.44

29.61

62.17

42.30

81.07

37.86

67.36

42.50

89.68

44.86

73.05

36.16

Switzerland

76.71

8.62

54.99

31.20

82.39

11.40

63.59

28.70

93.81

14.40

69.83

19.58

UK

67.30

16.16

59.74

18.70

72.66

16.16

65.55

20.00

81.61

19.83

73.28

21.37

US

64.70

0.00

65.92

19.30

71.48

0.00

70.94

19.20

78.03

0.00

74.40

18.78
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Table 2.4: Bivariate Regression Analyses
Independent variables

1980
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

1990
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

2000
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.
Left party power
.26 (.23)
.20 (.38)

Sig.
Left party power
.40 (.29)
.11 (.53)

Sig.
Left party power
.73 (.40)
*
.64 (.70)

Globalization
Left party power

Service workforce
.28 (.14)
*
.08 (.16)

Service workforce
.29 (.13)
**
.03 (.12)

Service workforce
.18 (.15)
.08 (.09)

Globalization
Left party power
Service workforce

Welfare generosity
.38 (.17)
**
.61 (.14) ***
.32 (.31)

Welfare generosity
.39 (.19)
*
.51 (.12)
***
.40 (.35)

Welfare generosity
.41 (.19)
**
.31 (.10)
***
.25 (.35)

Globalization
Service workforce

* indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01.

The results reported in Table 2.4 indicate that significant positive
relationships exist between globalization and welfare generosity and left
party power and welfare generosity, consistently in 1980, 1990, and 2000.
The signs of significant regression coefficients did not support the
hypothesized direction for globalization. It followed the contention of a small
group of scholars who argue that globalization positively affects welfare
generosity due to the increased need for social protection (Garrett 1998;
Kittel and Winner 2005).
The signs of significant regression coefficients consistently supported
the hypothesized direction for left party power. The efficiency argument
mentioned in Chapter 1—that globalization reduces political power and
economic autonomy thereby causing welfare state retrenchment (Blackmon,
2006; Stiglitz 2006)—was not supported by these findings. Rather, left party
power displayed consistently strong positive relationships throughout. The
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greater the left party power, the more generous welfares states are.
Interestingly, globalization had a significant positive effect on left party
power in 2000 while no relationship was found prior to this time point.
Although tentative, this may confirm Kim‘s (2009) findings on
curvilinear relationship between globalization and welfare state generosity.
Welfare states with stronger left party power are more likely to hold on to the
social welfare ideals, particularly in recent years of heightened globalization.
While the de-industrialization argument (Iversen and Cusack 2000) pointed
to including service workforce as an internal economic structure variable, it
did not significantly affect welfare generosity. Globalization had significant
effects on service workforce in 1980 and 1990, but no relationship was found
in 2000.
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Chapter 3. Global Perspective II: Welfare States and
Poverty
This chapter investigates the effects of globalization, politics, and
social welfare commitment on poverty at the aggregate level. Various
measures of poverty and their relationship with key structural global and
domestic variables are examined. The underlying assumption is that poverty
is a form of social exclusion based on its ‗structural and multidimensional
nature of processes by which individuals or specific areas are actually
excluded‘ from activities that are an intrinsic part of socio-economic
integration (Bhalla and Lapeyre 2004, 15).
The series of data analyses in this chapter is based on compilation of
key variables from two major data sets—the OECD data set and the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The OECD Statistics Portal allows
researchers, government officials, and other interested users to extract key
cross-national indicators of OECD member countries. Particularly, this
chapter used poverty rate, poverty gap, Gini coefficient, public social
expenditure, labor market policy expenditure, unemployment rate, and union
density around year 2000 for comparison with the point of Wave V in LIS
data.
The LIS is a cross-national and historically harmonized data archive
and a Research Institute located in Luxembourg. The LIS archive contains
nationally representative individual-level data sets with some key
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standardized variables (Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). It is made up of two
primary databases. The LIS database includes income microdata from a
large number of countries at multiple points in time. The newer LWS
Database includes wealth microdata from a smaller selection of countries.
Both databases include labor market and demographic data as well.
Microdata is accessed for social scientific research using a remote-access
system.

3.1.

Poverty in the Global Context
The conventional measures of poverty include the head count ratio and

the mean poverty gap (Rodgers and Rodgers 1991, 342). First, the relative
headcount measure of poverty is considered typical in cross-national poverty
research (Brady 2003; 2005; 2006; 2009a; DeFina and Thanawala 2001;
Hagenaars 1991; Jantti and Danziger 2000; Moller et al. 2003; Osberg and
Xu 2000; Rainwater and Smeeding 2004; Sen 1999; Smeeding et al. 2001).
Individuals are considered poor if the household in which he or she belongs
has total income below 50% of the overall median household income. The
headcount poverty is often translated into poverty rates (denoted by H) for
the entire country and for some specific groups within countries. The
headcount poverty rate is expressed by H  m / n , where n is the size of the
population, m is the number of poor.
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Second, poverty gap is a concept that measures the distance between
the relative poverty line and the overall mean household income. Pretransfer poverty gap has been growing over time and it would mean that
government transfers would have to be more generous to fill the poverty gap,
bringing families up to the poverty line (Ziliak 2008). The poverty gap
(denoted by G) is expressed as G  z   p , where z is the poverty threshold
and  p is the mean income of the poor. A severe limitation of G is that ―it is
not independent of the units in which income is measured‖ (Rodgers and
Rodgers 1991: 342). Therefore, I employ a more comparable measure of
poverty gap rate (GR) which by dividing G by z, better represents the depth of
poverty. This is expressed as GR 

z  p
z

. GR will be referred to as poverty

gap hereon forth.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Pre/Post-Transfer Poverty Rates
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the stark differences between the pre-transfer
(before taxes and government transfers) and post-transfer (after taxes and
government transfers) headcount poverty rates in 2000. Belgium had the
highest market income poverty at 35.60% compared to other advanced
democracies (mean=25.62%), but its post-transfer poverty drops significantly
to 10.40%. The United States on the other hand had pre-transfer poverty
rate close to the overall average (25.40%) but ends up with the highest posttransfer poverty rate (17.10%). The average post-transfer poverty rate is
9.68%.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Pre/Post-Transfer Poverty Gap
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Figure 3.2 shows the change in poverty gap before and after taxes and
government transfers in 2000. One can observe an overall trend of high pretransfer poverty gaps in most of the affluent democracies. Belgium and
Australia had the highest pre-transfer poverty gap at 75.40% below the
poverty line and Spain had the lowest at 40.00%. The United States had the
pre-transfer poverty gap of 56.80% which is lower than the overall average of
66.26%. Despite its relatively low pre-transfer poverty gap, its post-transfer
poverty gap is among the highest at 34.70%. The overall mean poverty gap is
26.88% with Ireland having the lowest score of 15.40%.
Figure 3.3: Percentage Change in Poverty Rate and Poverty Gap
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Figure 3.3 summarizes the extent to which both poverty rate and
poverty gap have decreased after taxes and government transfers in 2000.
The bars indicate the magnitude of percentage change, which reflects the
degree to which government social policy intervention has been effective. The
average percentage reduction in poverty rate is 60.81% and that of poverty
gap is 57.09%. Most countries either keep their effectiveness about the same
between poverty rate and poverty gap or do slightly better with poverty rate.
Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland had much higher percentage
change rates for poverty rate.
Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been
more effective in terms of reducing poverty gap than poverty rate. Among
them, Ireland has a disproportionately higher percentage change rate for
poverty gap than poverty rate. The United States is second only to Spain for
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less effective government social policies in terms of reducing both poverty
rate and poverty gap. Figure 3.4 depicts the poverty rates among workingage adults in 17 affluent democracies from the LIS data. The highest poverty
rate of 17% found in the United States further confirms its lack of social
welfare commitment to reducing poverty.
Figure 3.4: LIS Poverty Rates for Working-Age Adults 18-65

Many studies have investigated comparative levels of inequality
among nations and the growing trend of inequality in the United States since
the beginning of the 1970s (Smeeding 2005). Often used by economists in
studies of inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 (perfect equality of
income distribution) and 1 (perfect inequality of income distribution). A Gini
score of 1 would indicate one person getting 100% of the total income and 0
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would indicate every person getting the same percentage of the total income.
Therefore, if country A has a higher score between the range of 0 and 1
compared to country B, it would mean that country A would have a more
unequal distribution of income. In table 3.1, the United Kingdom and the
United States have the highest Gini coefficients and Denmark and Sweden
have lowest.
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Table 3.1: Country-level characteristics from OECD (around year 2000)
Welfare
state
regimes

Social
democratic

Poverty

Countries

Gini
coefficient
Pre-transfer Post-transfer Pre-transfer Post-transfer

Southern
European

Public social expenditure
Cash
In-kind
Total
benefits
benefits

23.20

5.10

74.00

20.90

0.23

1.43

25.81

13.17

10.62

Finland (2000)

18.00

6.40

55.10

20.70

0.26

0.36

24.31

14.95

8.48

Norway (2000)

22.60

6.30

64.80

28.20

0.26

0.16

21.31

11.16

9.54

Sweden (2000)

27.00

5.30

68.70

26.10

0.24

1.37

28.54

14.23

12.55

30.00

0.25

0.55

26.37

18.08

7.77

9.30

Belgium (2000)

35.60

10.40

75.40

38.40

0.29

0.39

25.28

15.54

8.66

France (2000)

33.00

7.20

74.60

24.80

0.28

0.79

27.86

16.60

10.07

Germany (2000)

31.10

9.20

74.10

30.20

0.27

0.67

26.18

15.55

9.45

17.30

0.26

0.06

19.75

13.20

6.36

Luxembourg (2000)

Liberal

WSI

Denmark (2000)

Austria (2000)

Conservative

Poverty gap

5.50

Netherlands (1999)

23.60

6.80

72.70

20.30

0.28

-0.36

19.79

11.21

7.07

Switzerland (2000)

16.50

7.50

54.50

36.60

0.28

-0.72

17.88

10.76

6.57

Australia (2001)

29.80

12.20

75.40

28.90

0.32

-1.13

17.84

9.32

8.15

Canada (2000)

21.60

10.30

24.40

0.30

-0.47

16.50

6.97

9.15

Ireland (2000)

25.70

15.40

61.50

12.10

0.30

-1.42

13.59

7.02

5.62

UK (1999)

27.80

10.20

73.00

23.20

0.37

-0.11

19.19

9.85

9.00

US (2000)

25.40

17.10

56.80

34.70

0.36

-1.53

14.50

7.64

6.71

Italy (2000)

31.10

11.80

73.30

37.00

0.34

0.30

23.26

16.07

6.63

Spain (2000)

17.90

13.70

40.00

30.00

0.34

-0.36

20.31

13.21

6.43
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Table 3.2: Country-level characteristics from OECD (around year 2000)
Welfare
state
regimes

Labor market policy expenditure
Countries

Total

UnemployActive LMP Passive LMP ment rate

Union
density

Public
Low-income
Public health
Left party
educational
seat
expenditure
expenditure

j

Social
democratic

Conservative

Liberal

Southern
European

Denmark (2000)

4.27

1.89

2.38

4.30

74.20

33.00

25.39

8.30

8.30

Finland (2000)

2.97

0.89

2.08

9.80

75.00

37.00

22.93

7.20

6.00

Norway (2000)

1.11

0.61

0.50

3.20

54.40

38.00

40.54

8.40

5.90

Sweden (2000)

3.09

1.75

1.34

5.60

79.10

40.00

44.86

8.20

7.20

Austria (2000)

1.69

0.52

1.17

3.60

36.50

33.00

33.38

9.90

5.60

Belgium (2000)

3.34

1.22

2.11

6.90

49.30

33.00

18.98

8.60

5.90

France (2000)

2.57

1.19

1.38

9.00

8.30

47.00

16.17

10.10

6.00

Germany (2000)

3.12

1.23

1.89

7.50

24.60

33.00

14.56

10.30

4.40

Luxembourg (2000)

-

-

0.43

2.20

43.10

35.00

15.68

5.80

Netherlands (1999)

3.23

1.47

1.75

2.80

22.60

33.00

13.20

8.00

5.00

Switzerland (2000)

1.10

0.56

0.54

2.60

20.80

37.00

14.40

10.20

5.40

Australia (2001)

1.25

0.37

0.88

6.30

24.70

34.00

18.77

8.30

4.70

Canada (2000)

1.10

0.40

0.70

6.80

30.40

16.00

0.00

8.80

5.10

Ireland (2000)

1.61

0.81

0.80

4.40

39.30

36.00

5.98

6.30

4.30

UK (1999)

0.56

0.25

0.31

5.40

29.60

7.00

18.83

7.00

4.30

US (2000)

0.45

0.17

0.28

4.00

12.80

5.00

0.00

13.60

4.90

Italy (2000)

-

-

0.62

10.20

34.70

35.00

8.56

8.10

4.50

Spain (2000)

2.14

0.79

1.35

11.10

16.70

35.00

13.50

7.20

4.30
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for LIS working age adults (18-65)
Welfare
state
regimes
Social
democratic

Conservative

Liberal

Southern
European
All countries

Countries

N

LIS Poverty

Age

Female

# of
children # of earners Working
under 18

High
education

Medium
education

Finland (2000)

6,952

.05

42.32

.48

.94

1.60

.81

.35

.41

Norway (2000)

8,036

.06

40.84

.48

.99

1.72

.78

.27

.59

Sweden (2000)

8,304

.07

41.63

.50

.93

1.53

.81

.23

.56

Austria (2000)

1,397

.07

42.25

.50

.88

1.52

.67

.07

.70

Belgium (2000)

1,260

.08

40.61

.51

.99

1.31

.73

.36

.33

France (2000)

6,255

.08

40.18

.51

1.01

1.37

.70

.27

.41

Germany (2000)

6,980

.08

40.78

.50

.74

1.36

.74

.21

.50

Luxembourg (2000)

1,422

.06

47.36

.51

1.15

1.48

.47

.19

.36

Netherlands (1999)

2,686

.05

40.42

.51

.99

1.43

.75

.25

.44

Switzerland (2000)

2,280

.08

40.52

.51

.90

-

.79

.22

.66

Australia (2001)

5,216

.13

40.40

.51

1.06

1.50

.72

-

-

Canada (2000)

17,817

.12

40.29

.51

.98

1.76

.75

-

-

Ireland (2000)

1,392

.15

39.87

.51

1.47

1.66

.69

.20

.29

UK (1999)

14,280

.13

41.39

.52

.99

1.39

.70

-

-

US (2000)

28,469

.17

41.15

.52

1.20

1.70

.74

.34

.52

Italy (2000)

5,134

.12

41.98

.51

.71

1.28

-

.11

.42

Spain (2000)

2,958

.13

38.52

.51

.78

1.53

.59

.13

.27

120,838

.13

41.04

.51

1.02

1.51

.73

.27

.49
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A correlation matrix of all poverty and income distribution measures is
observed. Several findings stand out. Percentage change in poverty rate and
that of poverty gap are significantly correlated (r=.545, p<.05). The LIS
poverty rate is significantly associated with Gini coefficient (r=.838, p<.001),
post-transfer poverty rate (r=.921, p<.001), and percentage change in poverty
rate (r=-.753, p=.001). Post-transfer poverty rate is also significantly
associated with inequality (r=.781, p<.001) and reduction of poverty rate (r=.832, p<.001).
Countries with most effective social policies in terms of reducing the
poverty rate tend to be also effective when it comes to reducing the poverty
gap. As unequal distribution of income increases, the poverty rate increases.
The greater the reduction in poverty rate, the lower the LIS poverty rate.
Using these measures of poverty, the following sections examine how
globalization, politics, social welfare commitment contribute to poverty and
income distribution at the aggregate levels among 17 affluent democracies.

3.2.

Effects of Globalization and Politics on Poverty
In Chapter 2, globalization and politics were found to be independently

affecting welfare state generosity. Furthermore, globalization had an effect
on left party power, suggesting a possible mediating effect of politics between
globalization and welfare state generosity. This section examines the direct
effects of globalization and politics on poverty. Literature on globalization is
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not conclusive about this relationship. Some argue that globalization
contributes to higher income inequality as increased capital mobility and
economic interdependence undermines domestic economies from rewarding
individuals equitably (Hurrell and Woods 1995; Reich 1992; Tonelson 2000).
Others who support global liberalism assert that it is a powerful engine of
economic growth, benefiting all income groups (Burtless, Lawrence, Litan,
and Shapiro 1998; Lawrence 1996).
The former scholars argue that with lack of economic resources, the
low-income populations are at higher risks of experiencing poverty under
―increasingly ruthless and unforgiving international competition that has
seriously jeopardized their wages, benefits, and job security‖ (Mahler 2004,
1027). The latter group of scholars contrarily point to globalization‘s
stimulus effects on lowering of prices by international competition, making it
advantageous to low-income groups, and to promote domestic flexibility in
class mobility leading to less inequality.
Mahler (2004) explored the effects of three major modes of
international integration—trade, direct foreign investment, and financial
openness—on income distribution and redistribution. He found a borderline
significant effect examining the relationship between one of the international
integration variables—financial openness—and earnings inequality.
The analyses conducted in this section similarly found no relationship
between globalization and various dimensions of poverty (see Table 3.4).
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Unlike what many scholars have maintained, globalization does not directly
add to the higher risk of poverty. However, it does directly affect welfare
state generosity and politics in 2000, as found in Chapter 2, and politics
directly affects welfare state generosity. This would mean that politics plays
a major role as a buffer for maintaining social protection against
vulnerability in the global market.
Table 3.4: Effects of Globalization on Poverty
Independent variables

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

Globalization

Pre-transfer
poverty rate
-.26 (.30)

Post-transfer
poverty rate
-.03 (.29)

Globalization

Pre-transfer
poverty gap
.07 (.60)

Post-transfer
poverty gap
.19 (.23)

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

LIS poverty
.00 (.001)
Inequality
-.001 (.001)

* indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01.

Mahler (2004) found reasonably strong positive relationships between
several political variables—the partisan balance of national cabinets,
electoral turnout, union density, and the centralization of wage-setting
institutions—and an egalitarian income distribution and redistribution. He
argues that these findings confirm a growing number of studies emphasizing
the resilience of domestic political factors despite the challenges of economic
globalization.
Using eight different measures of left political institutions—(1) voter
turnout, (2) cumulative historical power of left parties, (3) percent of votes for
left parties, (4) the percent of seats for left parties, (5) wage coordination, (6)
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neocorporatism, (7) gross union density, and (8) employed union density—
Brady (2003) found that these political factors combine with and partially
channel through welfare state generosity to reduce poverty. The strength of
left political institutions consistently demonstrates a powerful negative
impact on poverty.
The analyses conducted in this section reveal that political institutions
have significant effects on post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and
income inequality (see Table 3.5). Politics plays a minor role in terms of
explaining pre-transfer poverty, both for poverty rate and poverty gap. And
it does little in terms of explaining the variance in post-transfer poverty gap.
As union density goes up, poverty rate and inequality goes down. As the
number of electoral seats from poor districts increase, poverty rate and
inequality decreases. Also, cumulative left party power negatively affects
poverty rate and inequality.

Table 3.5: Effects of Politics on Poverty
Independent variables

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

Union density
Low-income seat
Left party power

Pre-transfer
poverty rate
-.03 (.07)
.02 (.13)
-.001 (.12)

Union density
Low-income seat
Left party power

Pre-transfer
poverty gap
.05 (.12)
.05 (.26)
.16 (.25)

* indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01.
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β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

Post-transfer
poverty rate
-.09 (.04) **
-.16 (.07) **
-.18 (.06) ***
Post-transfer
poverty gap
-.09 (.08)
-.06 (.16)
-.01 (.15)

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

LIS poverty
-.001 (.001)
-.002 (.001)
-.002 (.001)

*
**
**

Inequality
-.001 (.001)
-.002 (.001)
-.002 (.001)

***
***
***

3.3.

Effect of Welfare State Commitment on Poverty
Esping-Andersen (1990), Iversen and Cusack (2000), and Notermans

(1993) challenge Wilensky‘s traditionally held linear paradigm, , whereby
economic performance or industrialization captured by GNP per capita
determines welfare state ‗spending‘ cross-nationally. These authors have
taken diverse steps to conceptualize and measure welfare state commitment
and have modified the traditional measure of social welfare—namely
spending on social programs—which has dominated the field of comparative
welfare state over the years.
Esping-Andersen (1990, 12) introduces a common textbook definition of
welfare state that constitutes, ―state responsibility for securing some basic
modicum of welfare for its citizens.‖ This somewhat vague definition opened
the doors for diverse approaches to conceptualize and operationalize welfare
state activities. Most prevalent among them has been the traditional mode of
attributing social expenditure to a state‘s commitment to welfare. EspingAndersen challenges this by asserting, ―not all social spending counts
equally‖ (Ibid, 19), for some would spend more on targeted social assistance
for the poor and others on tax privileges for the middle class and full
employment for all. He also takes a firm stance against a mere
transformation of state activities towards acceptance of standard social
programs to be regarded as a state‘s commitment to welfare state.
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Esping-Andersen‘s conceptualization of welfare state is best captured
by commitment to social citizenship and solidarity. He cites Titmuss‘s work
on residual and institutional welfare distinction for having contributed to
incorporating some essential tools for characterization of welfare states. The
content of these tools include: ―targeted versus universalistic programs, the
conditions of eligibility, the quality of benefits and services and … the extent
to which employment and working life are encompassed in the state‘s
extension of citizen rights‖ (Ibid, 20).
In essence, Esping-Andersen‘s conceptualization of welfare state
commitment rests on the degree to which a state is granting social rights.
His work offers a strong emphasis on the concept of social right as the
guiding principle for which all welfare states should follow. The following is
what he considers as key elements of social citizenship:
If social rights are given the legal and practical status of
property rights, if they are inviolable, and if they are granted
on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will
entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis
the market. But the concept of social citizenship also involves
social stratification: one‘s status as a citizen will compete with,
or even replace, one‘s class position (Ibid, 21).
In this sense, both de-commodification and social stratification are
used as proxy variables for a state‘s commitment to social rights, which are
used as measures to characterize the typology of welfare states into three
categories: (1) liberal; (2) conservative; and (3) social democratic. Higher
scores on the composite index would indicate higher levels of de-
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commodification, corresponding to the three types of welfare state regimes:
(1) high de-commodification (=social democratic); (2) low de-commodification
(=liberal); and (3) moderate de-commodification (=conservative). He finds in
his study of 18 industrial democracies that combined de-commodification
scores cluster around three groups of high, low, and moderate decommodification.
De-commodification is a concept that captures the degree to which ―a
service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a
livelihood without reliance on the market‖ (Ibid, 22). Or one can simply put
it as capturing ―the degree of market-independence for an average worker‖
(Ibid, 50). The author uses combined scores of de-commodification by three
social welfare programs—pensions, sickness, and unemployment cash
benefits—which summarize a list of variables3 that illustrate ―the ease with
which an average person can opt out of the market‖ (Ibid, 49).
In other words, de-commodification accounts for social rights by being
operationalized as the degree of generosity in benefits and restrictions among
core social welfare programs. Social stratification is the second concept of
interest to Esping-Andersen for measuring welfare state commitment. He
contends that welfare states not only intervene in the structure of inequality,
but also is ―an active force in the ordering of social relations‖ by providing a
system of stratification (Ibid, 23).
(1) The prohibitiveness of conditions for eligibility, such as work experience, contributions,
or means-tests; (2) the strength of in-built disincentives (such as waiting days for cash
benefits); and (3) the degree to which benefits approximate normal expected earnings-levels.
3
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Social democratic regimes (e.g., Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden) provide comprehensive social provisions and universal coverage.
Liberal regimes (e.g., Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
the United States) prefer market solutions and only provide minimal social
transfers to the most needy. Conservative regimes (e.g., Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) have
social programs that sustain status differences by providing different benefits
to different occupational groups (Leira 2002). Mediterranean countries (e.g.,
Italy, and Spain) are separately grouped as Southern European based on
their dualistic schemes, institutional fragmentation, universal health care, a
mix of public and private welfare, and particularism and clientelism (Tai and
Treas 2008).
In contrast to Esping-Andersen, Iversen and Cusack (2000) and
Notermans (1993) do not engage in much theoretical discussions on what
constitutes a welfare state. Iversen and Cusack implicitly assume that the
welfare state is a response to demands for social insurance and compensation
to meet economic insecurity encountered by its citizens. Here, they review
three distinct ways in which governments have responded to such demands:
(1) promoting employment in private services and supported by public
insurance schemes; (2) maintaining extensive regulation in private services
while expanding employment in public services; and (3) regulating private
sector service employment without allowing growth in the public sector (Ibid,
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314-16). They try to explain these variations by estimating welfare state
commitment measured in terms of the two main components of welfare-state
spending—transfers and government consumption.
Iversen and Cusack incorporate somewhat modified social spending
variables as proxies for welfare state commitment as compared to the ones
used in the traditional comparative research. Replicating Garrett‘s usage of
these two variables as dependent variables capturing welfare state
commitment, they made some refinements to the variables in order to more
accurately take into account nondiscretionary effects in transfers and
consumption measures.
They define government transfers as ―the percentage share of transfers
in GDP relative to the percentage share of the nonworking population in the
total population‖ and government consumption as ―total government
consumption of goods and services net of military spending as a percentage of
GDP‖ (Ibid, 348). While these are much improved social spending variables,
they suffer the same criticism of government spending not capturing the
ideological dimensions of welfare state commitment. In this regard, their
composite economic index of social spending could not account for the quality,
the composition, or the magnitude of spending by various categories of social
policies.
Notermans (1993) to some degree implicitly endorses the idea of
promoting equality and full employment as a social right that underlies
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welfare state commitment. When the economic conditions on which Social
Democracy and Keynesian strategy is based does not operate in favor of its
sustenance, the argument for social rights as welfare state commitment could
not hold. The ideal welfare state according to Notermans (1993, 134) is a
policy regime, ―which found its roots in the thirties and which gave
preference to growth and employment over fixed exchange rates.‖ The
welfare state commitment varies with the state of existence (when full
employment policy acquires a priority status) at the one end and nonexistence (when inflationary policy becomes dominant at the expense of full
employment policy) at the other end.
Scruggs and Allan (2006) operationalize welfare state generosity based
on three main areas of social insurance programs: pensions, unemployment
insurance, and sickness benefits. These programs protect workers against
the risk of old age, unemployment, and illness. They calculate the net
program replacement rates and create an aggregate generosity score using a
modified approach from the one used by Esping-Andersen (1990). After
adjustment (adding 2 to the scores ranging from -2 to 2) to the standardized
replacement rate, the replacement rate ranges from 0 to 4. Also, countries
are coded 1 to 3 based on the distribution of the scores on other
characteristics—e.g., waiting period, duration, qualifying period, etc. Each
program generosity scores are calculated and then added to obtain the
general benefit generosity score (Scruggs 2008). He finds that welfare state
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generosity is associated with both lower relative poverty and absolute
poverty.
Brady (2009a) developed a Welfare State Index (WSI) that measures
welfare effort, generosity, and extensiveness. This standardized score
(mean=0, s.d.=1) represent a composite score of social welfare expenditures,
social security transfers and government expenditures as a percentage of
GDP, and public health spending as a percentage of total health spending.
This measure correlates strongly with Scruggs and Allan‘s (2008) measure of
welfare state generosity (r=.63), but two countries in Brady‘s (2009a) sample
does not appear in this dataset. Brady (2009a) reports that WSI has a
significant effect on poverty.
Contributing to these two most recent studies on welfare state
generosity and poverty in Western industrialized countries, numerous
studies in comparative social policy have found similar results (Brady 2005;
Carroll 1999; Ferrarini 2006; Kangas 1991; Kangas and Palme 2000;
Kenworthy 1999). They show that welfare states have effectively intervened
in the lifecycle events that often lead to economic hardships and
vulnerability—i.e., childhood, child rearing, old age, sickness, and job loss—
and therefore have significantly reduced poverty. Brady (2005) found that
social security transfers and public health spending as indicators of social
welfare commitment significantly reduce poverty. These effects are much
greater than economic and demographic determinants of poverty.
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Table 3.6: Effects of Welfare State Commitment on Poverty
Independent variables

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

Welfare state index (Brady)
Welfare state generosity (Scruggs)
Social expenditure
Cash benefit spending
In-kind benefit spending
Total LMP expenditure
Active LMP expenditure
Passive LMP expenditure
Public health expenditure
Public educational expenditure

Pre-transfer
poverty rate
1.45 (1.64)
-.02 (.21)
.44 (.30)
.61 (.43)
.77 (.79)
.92 (1.29)
2.05 (2.85)
.88 (2.15)
.43 (.86)
-.33 (1.32)

Post-transfer
poverty rate
-3.05 (.71) ***
-.33 (.10) ***
-.47 (.15) ***
-.46 (.23)
*
-1.10 (.41) **
-1.72 (.70) **
-4.09 (1.45) **
-1.95 (1.22)
.53 (.48)
-2.24 (.59) ***

Welfare state index (Brady)
Welfare state generosity (Scruggs)
Social expenditure
Cash benefit spending
In-kind benefit spending
Total LMP expenditure
Active LMP expenditure
Passive LMP expenditure
Public health expenditure
Public educational expenditure

Pre-transfer
poverty gap
4.51 (2.94)
.22 (.31)
.90 (.58)
.84 (.92)
2.63 (1.36) *
2.86 (2.48)
2.05 (2.85)
7.24 (5.41)
-.02 (1.63)
1.94 (2.45)

Post-transfer
poverty gap
.03 (2.11)
-.27 (.27)
.27 (.39)
.58 (.51)
-.09 (.997)
-1.08 (1.55)
-3.15 (3.32)
-.86 (2.65)
2.40 (.80) ***
-.73 (1.63)

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

LIS poverty
-.03 (.009)
-.004 (.001)
-.005 (.002)
-.006 (.002)
-.008 (.005)
-.02 (.008)
-.05 (.02)
-.03 (.01)
.004 (.005)
-.03 (.009)

***
***
***
**
**
**
**
***

Inequality
-.03 (.009)
-.004 (.001)
-.005 (.002)
-.005 (.003)
-.01 (.005)
-.02 (.007)
-.05 (.02)
-.03 (.01)
.003 (.006)
-.03 (.006)

***
***
**
*
*
***
***
**
***

* indicates p<.10, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01.

Table 3.6 shows the results from a serious of bi-variate regression
analyses of poverty on variables that indicate welfare states‘ commitment to
social welfare. Close to none of these government interventions had
significant impact of pre-transfer poverty—both the poverty rate and poverty
gap. Only in-kind benefit spending had a positive relationship with pretransfer poverty gap. Greater the spending on in-kind benefits, the larger the
poverty gap becomes. Interpretations would need to be made with care as
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this may suggest reducing in-kind provision of benefits due to its countering
effects on reducing the depth of poverty.
Moreover, the welfare state variables do little to impact poverty gap in
general. Other than the countering effect of public health expenditure on
post-transfer poverty gap, there is literally no significant effect found. As
public health expenditure increases, post-transfer poverty gap also increases.
Again, caution is warranted when interpreting this result. This may be in
part due to those who have left poverty due to higher spending on public
health, which leaves those who are in deeper poverty for the post-transfer
poverty gap to be calculated.
Overall, these variables contributed significantly to post-transfer
poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality. Both WSI and Scruggs‘s
indexes of welfare state generosity significantly reduce the poverty rate and
income inequality. Notably, total social expenditure (including cash
spending), total labor market policy expenditure (including active labor
market policy expenditure), and public educational expenditure largely
affected post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income equality.

3.4.

Effects of Other Socio-Economic Variables on Poverty
Consistent with the literature reviewed in the previous sections,

Moller, Bradley, Huber, Nielsen, and Stephens (2003) have found that
welfare state generosity, constitutional structure—i.e., number of veto
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points—and the left political power in unions and in government explain the
extent of income redistribution. On the other hand, socio-economic factors—
i.e., de-industrialization and unemployment—significantly impact pretax/transfer poverty rates of working-age populations in advanced capitalist
democracies.
Brady (2006) examined the extent to which manufacturing
employment, agricultural employment, female labor force participation, the
elderly population, and children in single mother families as structural
variables affect headcount poverty. While having less powerful influence
than welfare state, structural variables were found to have greater effects
than economic growth. Backman (2009) also found that structural socioeconomic factors—i.e., female labor force participation and the proportion of
families with children—explain temporal variations in poverty rates.

Figure 3.5: Percentage of Female Working-Age Population and Poverty

88

After reviewing the correlation matrix of all socio-demographic
variables generated from LIS working-age adults—i.e., age, gender, number
of children in the household, number of earners in the household, percentage
of workers, unemployment rate, and percentage of highly educated—only
gender and number of earners were found to be significant. Figure 3.5
illustrates the positive relationships between the percentage of female
working-age adults and post-transfer poverty rate (b=168.91, t=2.42, p=.028)
and LIS poverty (b=2.09, t=3.14, p=.007).

Figure 3.6: Number of Earners in Household and Poverty

Figure 3.6 shows a negative relationship between the number of
earners and both pre-transfer poverty rate (b=-23.44, t=-3.34, p=.006) and
pre-transfer poverty gap (b=-43.50, t=-2.51, p=.029). As the average number
of earners in the household increase, the market income poverty (pre-transfer
poverty) decreases. Socio-economic variables in this data set may not have
much influence on aggregate poverty because the variations at the individual
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may yield more meaningful results. Theoretically, they determine the extent
to which an individual participates in the labor market activities.
This chapter examined the aggregate country-level variables as they
relate to various aspects of poverty at the aggregate level. Globalization was
not found to have a significant influence on poverty while left political power
and pro-poor electoral representation had significant impact on post-transfer
poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality. Variables that represented
welfare state generosity, or often referred to as welfare states‘ social welfare
commitment, were found to be very significant when it comes to affecting
post-transfer poverty rate, LIS poverty, and income inequality. The following
chapter investigates the poverty at the individual level within the local
context.
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Chapter 4. Local Perspective: Poverty in the U.S.
Chapter (Sections 4.1-4.3) Published as:
Hong, P.Y.P. and Pandey, S. 2008. ―Differential effects of human capital on
the poor and the near poor: Evidence of social exclusion.‖ Journal of Poverty,
12(4): 456–480.
Centeno and Lopez-Alvez (2001, 7, 9) see grand theorizing efforts in
comparative analysis offer little contextuality, contingency, and relationality
by failing to specify the functions associated with the social phenomenon
under study. Case-specific theories give full analytic attention to small
details that might contribute to explaining a certain phenomenon from one
particular case. What Centeno and Lopez-Alvez (2001) refer to as ―context‖
are history, culture/local practices, institutions, and so forth that make each
case carry a unique explanation of the phenomenon at hand.
This chapter examines the effects of individual human capital and
demographic differences on poverty at the individual level among workingage adults. A nationally representative data from the United States is used
to closely investigate these relationships. This case-specific analysis provides
the context of welfare state retrenchment—i.e., welfare reform—within which
variations in individuals‘ access to education, training, and health determine
the degree to which one experiences poverty.

4.1.

Human Capital, Social Exclusion, and Poverty in the U.S.
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According to the human capital theory, investment in human capital
can raise the future returns in the labor market, even though it may entail
opportunity costs in forgone short-term earnings (Becker 1964; 1993). Many
researchers have for decades linked human capital—in the form of education
(Schultz 1961; Becker 1964; Zhan and Pandey 2002; 2004a), training (Mincer
1962; Hamilton 2002), and health (Grossman 1972; Bartel and Taubman
1979; Burkhauser, Butler, Mitchell, and Pincus 1986)—to labor productivity
and economic wellbeing. In essence, educated, skilled, and healthy
individuals tend to enjoy higher occupational status and earnings, thus
increase their chances of upward mobility.
However, the quality of the U.S. workforce on average is falling behind
relative to the labor market demands. While labor supply would need to
balance out the demand for skilled workers with good education, training,
and health in order to ensure labor market stability, only about 28% of
Americans 25 years and over had a bachelor‘s degree as of 2004 (U.S. Census
Bureau 2005). In a changing global economy with more jobs requiring postsecondary education, there is a mismatch between the projected growth of
these jobs and the growth in the number of skilled workers. Jobs that
require higher education are expected to account for 42% of total job growth
by 2010 (Hecker 2002). It is projected that the increase in the number of
individuals with post-secondary education over the next 20 years will only be
at 19% as opposed to a 138% rise between 1980 and 2000 (Ellwood 2003).
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Given this economic environment, the low-income individuals and
families particularly face greater social exclusion in terms of not being able to
access quality education and training, and maintain good health (Silver 2006).
Highlighting its structural roots, Estivill (2003, 19) defines social exclusion as
―an accumulation of confluent processes with successive ruptures arising
from the heart of the economy, politics and society, which gradually distances
and places persons, groups, communities and territories in a position of
inferiority in relation to centres of power, resources and prevailing values.‖
In fact, low education, low skills, and poor health confluence are the most
common forms of barriers to employment that former and current TANF
recipients experience in the labor market (Goldberg 2002).
First, pursuing higher education becomes a distant goal when met
with the reality of nearly half of single mothers on welfare do not graduate
from high school (Gueron and Hamilton 2002; Zedlewski and Anderson 2001).
One major public policy paradox is that the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA; Public Law 104-193) and
its reauthorization in the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA; Public Law 109-171)
reduced poor women‘s access to college education and increased obligation to
find employment.
PRWORA shifted the federal policy emphasis toward ―Work First‖
approach, which limited opportunities for welfare recipients to pursue a
college education (Cohen 1998). As a result, three years after welfare reform,
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there were fewer welfare recipients with college degrees (Peterson, Song, and
Jones-DeWeever 2002). Further jeopardizing the chances for acquiring postsecondary education, DRA substantially increased the proportion of welfare
recipients—i.e., 50% in a given state—who must participate in work activities
for a specified number of hours each week (Greenberg 2006).
These welfare-to-work policies mark the triumph of the Labor Force
Attachment (LFA) approach or ―employment-focused‖ programs over the
Human Capital Development (HCD) or ―education-focused‖ programs
(Hamilton et al. 2001). LFA include programs that emphasize short-term job
search assistance to find employment quickly while HCD promote longerterm skill-building activities, for the most part basic education (Gueron and
Hamilton 2002). Hamilton et al. (2001) found that LFA had greater effects
on employment, earnings, and welfare receipt compared to HCD. It is
projected that higher costs, higher dropout rates, and longer completion time
of HCD may have given way to the short-term success of LFA, comparatively
speaking, since HCD cannot immediately produce measurable outcomes
(Freedman, Michell, and Navarro 1999).
Second, training programs for the poor have been found to be less than
effective. This is due in part to poor funding and administration, which are
common characteristics of training packages for economically vulnerable
groups (Grubb 1995). A national Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) study
suggested that classroom skills training did not increase the earnings of
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welfare recipients (Orr et al. 1996). Little evidence of success is found in
training and short term educational programs for single mothers on public
assistance (Hamilton 2002). Training may have some effects on the increase
in earnings but the gains tend to be less than enough to move people out of
poverty (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; LaLonde 1995).
Public sector-sponsored training in general suffers from strikingly
modest investments compared to the level of skills deficiencies that the
programs try to overcome (LaLonde 1995). The number of workers who
received training under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L.
105-220) was 17% lower in 2003 compared to that in 1998, which was the
final year of WIA‘s predecessor, JTPA (Frank and Minoff 2005). The
underfunded WIA is only able to provide services to a fraction of those who
need training and employment services when skill shortages undermine U.S.
companies (Baider 2008).
Third, when it comes to health, the Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation (MDRC) found in a study of low-income women in four
major cities that 34% among non-working welfare recipients suffered some
physical conditions that limited work (Polit, London, and Martinez 2001).
Similar health limitations were reported by 17% of a national sample of
TANF recipients (Zedlewski and Anderson 2001). Also, the latest
government data available suggest that close to 47 million (or 15.8% of the
population) were without health insurance in 2006 and the number rose by
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2.2. million between 2005 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith
2007). This is particularly significant for low-income jobseekers as reviews of
empirical literature indicate significant relationships between health
insurance and health (Levy and Meltzer 2001) and health and labor market
outcomes (Currie and Madrian 1999).
Despite what the human capital theory may have suggested over the
years, the poor seem to be disconnected from how the theory should play out
in the mainstream society. Lack of human capital for the economically
disadvantaged in this case may reflect their structurally vulnerable positions
in society, resulting from being trapped in the lower segment of the
bifurcated labor market (Rank 2004; Schneider 2005). Lack of human capital
as structurally vulnerable attributes for the poor could be evidence of social
exclusion taking place in the American labor market.
In this regard, this chapter explores the differential effects of human
capital on the poor and other income categories. It would be important to
investigate the extent to which human capital is distributed
disproportionately among the poor compared to other upper income
categories. Understanding how education, training, and health status affect
the poor differently becomes crucial particularly when vulnerability in the
labor market could increase with any one of these elements missing for the
poor. The following research question is asked: What is the role of human
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capital in the form of education, training and health status in explaining
different levels of poverty?

4.2.

Analyses of Human Capital and Poverty
The data for this analysis come from the Core and Topical Module files

of the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The 1996 panel, consisting of 12 waves or 48 months, starts in April 1996 and
ends in March 2000. The 1996 panel also includes an oversample of the low
income population in order to support the primary goal of the SIPP, which is
to produce longitudinal estimates of income and program participation,
paying most attention to improving the information for people who are
economically at risk, and improving the capability to respond to current
policy needs in topical areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). The SIPP is a
nationally representative, multi-panel, and longitudinal survey of about
9,000 housing units per month (36,700 in the entire 1996 panel) conducted by
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Data from Wave 8 (August - November 1998) of
the 1996 panel is used for the analyses, which comprises 46,562 working-age
individuals between ages 18 and 65. This particular wave was selected
because data on job training and health conditions were available in the
Topical Module 8 questions.

4.2.1. Variables
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Two dependent variables were used to measure the poverty status of
working-age adult individuals in this analysis. First, a dichotomous poverty
status variable indicates whether one‘s total household income in dollar
amount was above the official poverty line in August 1998. A value of 1 was
assigned for individuals who were identified as non-poor, having total
household income greater than or equal to the poverty threshold, and 0 for
those who were poor.
Second, a mutually exclusive multi-category poverty status variable
was created in order to further examine the extent to which educational
achievement and other accompanying human capital variables differentially
affect various levels of income groups beyond the poverty line.
Individuals whose total household income fell below the federal
poverty level (FPL) were coded as 0 once again. The non-poor group was
divided into three groups following the groupings used by Newacheck, Hung,
Park, Brindis, and Irwin (2003). The first group (coded 1) included the nearpoor individuals who lived in households with income greater than or equal
to 100% and less than 200% of the poverty line [also similarly used by Kasper,
Giovannini, and Hoffman (2000)]. The moderate income group (coded 2)
comprised individuals at 200-299% FPL, and the middle/high income group
(coded 3) had household income at greater than or equal to 300% FPL.
Three-hundred % FPL is close to the median household income for many as
nearly half (52.8%) of all Americans live within this threshold (U.S. Census
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Bureau 2006). Hereon forth, these categories are referred to by their
assigned numbers as indicated above, i.e., below 100% FPL will be referred to
as Category 0.
Control variables include demographic and employment-related factors
that have been found in previous research to have significant effects on
economic outcomes. The demographic control variables are respondent‘s age,
race, gender, marital status, and number of children under 18 living in the
household. Respondent‘s age and number of children under 18 living in the
household are continuous variables, while the remaining ones are categorical.
Race (non-White=1, White=0) and gender (female=1, male=0) are included as
factors associated with being poor. Since only little over 2% of the sample
was widowed, the variable marital status was collapsed into three categories:
never married, married, and previously married (divorced, separated, and
widowed) and was dummy coded with never married being the reference
category.
Two employment-related variables were included in this analysis:
Employment status of the respondent (working=1, not working=0) and the
presence of additional household earner(s). Additional adult earners may
include non-spouse adults living in the same household. While the lack of
additional earners complicates the economic situation of the poor, other
adults with zero or low earnings would be less than helpful. Inclusion of
additional earners in the household is important especially considering that
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heterosexual couple families are on decline and other forms of living
arrangements including—single parent, cohabiting, gay and lesbian couples
are on the rise. Additional earners would need to provide about $2,000 $3,700 each in earnings in order to offset the increase in family needs
required by an additional person (Lerman 2002).
In the current sample, there were 27,338 (35.7%) that were married.
Of these married individuals, 26,881 were living with the spouse and 457
were not living with the spouse. Among those 26,881 individuals who were
living with the spouse, 5,723 (21.29%) had no extra earner in the house other
than the income of the respondent. And 15,850 (58.9%) had one extra earner
in the house earning more than $2,000 annual income, who happened to be
the spouse of the respondent. Interestingly, about 20% of those who were
living with the spouse had earners other than the spouse who were
contributing to the household income. Also, of the total unmarried sample,
about 60% had other adults earning more than $2,000 annual income. A
dummy variable was created to capture the effect of additional earners.
Households with additional earners other than the respondent and the
spouse of the respondent that earned more than $2,000 annual income
received a score of 1 and the household with no additional earner served as
the reference group.
The independent variables of interest are a group of human capital
variables—educational attainment, job training, and work-preventing health
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conditions. Supported by previous research that suggested postsecondary
education is a strong predictor of economic well-being (Zhan and Pandey
2004a; 2004b), a four-category education variable was created: Less than
high school degree, high school degree / GED, some college, and college
degree and above. Then, these categories were dummy coded with less than
high school degree being the reference group. Job training is a dichotomous
independent variable that captures whether a respondent received any job
training between August 1988 and August 1998 (job training=1, no job
training=0). Health is a dichotomous independent variable that captures
whether a respondent had work-preventing health conditions at the time of
interview (in August 1998). A value 1 was assigned for individuals who
reported having health problems and 0 for those who did not.

4.2.2. Analysis and Findings
Three types of statistical analyses were conducted. First, a descriptive
analysis provided the demographic and poverty characteristics of the sample.
Second, poverty status was regressed on control variables and human capital
variables. A binomial logistic regression analysis examined the extent to
which human capital variables, together as a block and individually, may
influence poverty status. In order to observe the former, the log-likelihood
ratio (LR) test was conducted to assess whether there was a statistically
significant increase in the log-likelihood when the human capital variables
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together as a block were added to the control variables. Finally, a
multinomial logistic regression analysis was used in which a multi-category
poverty status variable was regressed on control variables and human capital
variables.
This method is particularly helpful when examining how multiple
categories in the dependent variable are affected differently in comparison to
a particular reference category. The ordinal character of the multi-level
poverty status variable might suggest using an ordered logistic regression,
but the failure to meet the parallel regression assumption justified the use of
multinomial logistic regression (Allison 1999). Comparisons were first made
using Category 0 as the comparison group with respect to all other categories.
Next, Category 1 was used as the base category in comparison with
Categories 2 and 3, followed by Category 2 being the base category in
comparison with Category 3. The following two hypotheses were tested:
(1)

Human capital has a significant effect on poverty in the
binomial model, and

(2)

Human capital has a differential effects on the poor and other
upper income categories in the multinomial model.

A weighted descriptive summary of demographic and poverty
characteristics is provided in Table 3.1. Individuals with household incomes
above 100% of the FPL are considered non-poor (90%), whereas those with
incomes below this threshold are considered poor (10%). The non-poor are
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divided into three groups: Category 1 (16%), Category 2 (18%), and Category
3 (56%). On average, the non-poor were older than the poor and had fewer
children under 18 living with them in the household. The poor were less
likely to be White, more likely to be female, and less likely to be married
compared to the non-poor. The non-poor had a much higher percentage of
individuals who were living with an additional earner with more than $2,000
annual income. Also, respondents in the non-poor category were more likely
to be working than the poor. Among the non-poor categories, Category 3 was
most likely to be White, most likely to be married, most likely to have
additional household earners, and most likely to be working. Also, this
category of households had the least number of children under 18.
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Table 4.1: Weighted Demographic and Poverty Characteristics of the Sample (N=46,562)
Non-poor (n=41,747)
Variables

Full Sample (%)

Poor (n=4,815)

10.17

Dependent variables

All non-poor

Relative poverty status

(0)

100-199%
(1)

200-299%
(2)

≥ 300%
(3)

89.83

15.88

17.82

56.13

Control variables
Age (years) a
Race
White
African American
Other
Female
Marital status
Never married
Married
Divorced or separated
Widowed
Number of children under 18 a
Additional household earner(s)
Working

39.29

37.76

39.46

37.82

38.42

40.26

82.94
12.31
4.74
50.75

69.46
24.06
6.49
58.25

84.47
10.98
4.55
49.90

77.77
16.98
5.26
52.69

81.62
13.62
4.75
51.23

87.27
8.45
4.28
48.69

27.21
57.70
12.99
2.09
.79
35.77
78.82

36.71
38.44
20.92
3.92
1.12
20.90
47.38

26.14
59.88
12.10
1.88
.75
37.45
82.37

29.63
51.64
15.72
3.00
1.10
25.13
67.51

26.74
56.99
13.79
2.48
1.14
34.99
78.86

24.96
63.13
10.53
1.38
.59
40.66
87.70

32.89
33.55
23.18
10.38
23.28
35.24

12.15
32.11
31.59
24.14
40.35
13.78

26.80
37.75
26.45
9.00
25.49
26.29

16.19
38.13
31.83
13.85
33.48
17.54

6.73
28.61
32.98
31.69
46.73
9.05

Human capital variables
Educational attainment
Less than high school
High school degree / GED
Some college (vocational, associates)
4-year college or above
Job training
Health conditions that prevent working

14.26
32.26
30.74
22.74
38.61
15.96

Note: a Mean scores are reported for continuous variables.
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Compared with the non-poor individuals, a higher proportion of the
poor had received less than high school education. On the other hand, the
non-poor were twice as likely to have had at least a 4-year college degree.
The non-poor also had a higher percentage of individuals who had received
some type of job training in the past 10 years. The poor were more likely
than the non-poor to have some health conditions that prevented them from
working. Particularly, when compared to other non-poor groups, Category 3
were most likely to have received a 4-year college degree or more, most likely
to have received some type of job training, and least likely to report having
any work-preventing health conditions.

4.2.3. Binomial Logistic Regression Analysis
A binomial logistic regression model explaining poverty status was
examined to assess factors related to the probability of living above FPL (see
Table 3.2). The log likelihood ratio (log likelihood=12,077.58) compares the
likelihood function for the model to the likelihood function if all coefficients
except the intercept are 0. There was a good fit between the model and the
data (2(13)=6,809.74, p<.001), which indicated that the independent
variables were better predictors of the dependent variable to have the value
of 1 (non-poor) than a model without them.
By using the LR test, a nested logistic regression model that only
included the control variables was compared with the unconstrained model
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that added a block of human capital variables to the control variables. The
LR test result suggested that adding these four human capital variables to
the control variables significantly increased the log likelihood value compared
to the model without them (2(5)=899.50, p<.001). This reconfirmed that the
human capital variables make up an important perspective in terms of
explaining the likelihood of an individual living above FPL.
As hypothesized, all three human capital variables strongly affected
poverty status. Educational attainment at all levels significantly increased
the chance of being non-poor. The adjusted odds of living above FPL for
individuals with a high school degree / GED were 1.76 times the odds for
those without a high school degree. In other words, the odds of living above
FPL for those with a high school degree are 76% higher than the odds for
those without a high school degree, holding control variables constant. The
odds of living above FPL for individuals with some college education were
2.25 times the odds for those with less than high school education. Having at
least a 4-year college degree was most influential in keeping people out of
poverty. The odds of these individuals living above FPL were 2.96 times the
odds for those with less than high school education.
Job training also kept people out of poverty. The adjusted odds of
living above FPL for those with some previous job training were 1.46 times
the odds for those without any job training.
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This chapter also showed that health conditions matter in explaining
poverty status. The odds of living in poverty for those with health conditions
that prevented them from working were 41% higher than for those who were
healthy and lacked any work preventing health conditions.
Looking at the control variables, older individuals and those who had
fewer children living in the household were more likely to be living above
FPL when all other variables were kept constant. The adjusted odds of nonWhite individuals living in poverty were 37% higher than the odds for White
individuals. Being female was associated with 8% higher odds of living in
poverty. Compared to never-married individuals, those who were married
were more likely to be non-poor while previously married ones were less
likely to be living above FPL. Having another household earner(s) with more
than $2,000 annual income increases the odds for living above FPL 5.14
times holding all other independent variables constant. Being employed is
also associated with 3.81 times the odds of being non-poor compared to not
being employed.
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Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Model Explaining Poverty Status (N=46,562)
Non-poor a
Independent variables

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

Odds ratio

Control variables
Age
Non-White
Female
(Never married)
Married
Previously married
Number of children
Additional household earner(s)
Working

.02 (.002)
-.46 (.04)
-.08 (.04)

***
***
*

1.02

1.25 (.05)
-.20 (.06)
-.33 (.02)
1.64 (.05)
1.34 (.04)

***
***
***
***
***

3.50

***
***
***
.38 (.04) ***
-.53 (.04) ***

1.76
2.25
2.96
1.46

.63
.92

.82
.72
5.14
3.81

Human capital variables
(Less than high school)
High school degree / GED
Some college (vocational, associates)
4-year college or above
Job training
Health conditions that prevent working

.57 (.04)
.81 (.05)
1.09 (.06)

2(13)
Log likelihood

LR test for human capital variables:
2(5)

6809.74
12077.58

***
–

899.50

***

.59
–
–
–

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.
Dependent variable (poverty status) = (0) Less than 100% poverty, (1) 100% poverty and above.

a

4.2.4. Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis
To make a closer examination of how multiple categories of poverty
status with reference to one another are affected by the independent
variables, a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted (see Table
3.3.). The dependent variable in this case was the multi-level poverty status
with four categories. This variable was regressed on the human capital
variables and the demographic and employment-related control variables.
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The analysis demonstrated a good fit between the model and the data
(2(39)=16,743.81, p<.001), which suggested that these independent variables
were better predictors of the dependent variable than a model without them.
First, when Category 0 (individuals with incomes less than 100% FPL)
was compared with three other income groups, with one exception, the
likelihood of being in higher income groups improved as the education level
increased. The odds of having incomes above 300% FPL versus those below
FPL for individuals with at least a 4-year college degree were 8.43 times the
odds for their counterparts without a high school degree (see Table 4.3).
Although less pronounced than Category 3, having a 4-year college degree
had a significant effect on the likelihood of being in Category 2 compared to
Category 0.
The notable exception was that having a 4-year college degree or more
did not show any difference in the likelihood of being in the near-poor income
level in Category 1 compared to Category 0. On the other hand, having a
high school degree / GED and some college education significantly increased
the chance of being in all levels of income groups versus Category 0. This
confirms the hypothesis that there is a differential effect of higher education
on the poor and other higher income categories.
Also, having received job training significantly contributed to the
increased likelihood of being in a higher income category with the exception
of one category. Once again to support the hypothesis of differential effects of
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human capital on the poor, having received job training did not significantly
affect the likelihood of being in Category 1 versus Category 0. In comparison
with other higher income categories, job training was consistently a strong
predictor. For instance, the odds of having an income above 300% FPL
versus being in Category 0 for those with job training were 90% higher than
the odds for those without any job training.
As expected, health conditions that prevented work had negative effect
on income. Consistently in comparison with all higher income categories,
individuals with work-preventing health conditions earned less. For instance,
the predicted odds of individuals with work-preventing health conditions to
have incomes above 300% poverty were 64% lower than those without such
conditions compared to the base group (that is, below 100% FPL).
Second, the non-poor categories were compared with each other.
Human capital variables consistently played critical roles in explaining the
odds of being in higher income categories. Among non-poor individuals, the
odds of belonging to a higher income group increased with education (see
Table 4.3). For example, when comparing between Categories 1 and 3,
individuals with a 4-year college had 9.56 times the odds of having incomes
above 300% FPL compared to the odds for those without a high school degree.
The odds ratio was remarkably high even when the comparison was between
Categories 2 and 3. The odds of having incomes above 300% FPL were 4.54
times for those with at least a 4-year college compared to individuals without
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a high school degree. Similarly, job training improved the odds of earning
incomes above 300% FPL by 43% and work preventing health conditions
reduced the odds of earning incomes above 300% FPL by 43%.
Some observations stand out in the findings with regard to the control
variables. What seemed more important in terms of the magnitude of effects
was the presence of additional earner(s) in the household. This factor, as
opposed to not having additional adults with earnings over $2,000 per year,
had the largest odds ratio (OR=8.77) among all variables affecting the odds of
being in higher income categories in comparison to Category 0. Another
control variable of importance was employment status, which greatly
contributed to the increased likelihood of being in a particular category in
comparison to the reference category. Finally, in every comparison,
previously married mothers consistently fared worse than never married
mothers in terms of their income.
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Model Explaining Multi-Category Poverty Status (N=46,562)
Poverty status
Independent variables

(0) vs. (1)
Odds
β̂
ratio

(0) vs. (2)
Odds
β̂
ratio

.01 *** 1.01
-.22 *** .80
-.05
.95

.02 *** 1.02
-.41 *** .66
-.06
.94

β̂

(0) vs. (3)
Odds
ratio

(1) vs. (2)
Odds
β̂
ratio

(1) vs. (3)
Odds
β̂
ratio

(2) vs. (3)
Odds
β̂
ratio

.02 *** 1.02
-.52 *** .60
-.06 *
.94

.01 *** 1.01
-.33 *** .72
-.05 * .95

Control variables
Age
Non-White
Female
(Never married)
Married
Previously married
Number of children
Additional household earner(s)
Working

1.29
-.07
-.27
1.62
1.32

*** 3.65

.99
*** .90
*** 2.93
*** 2.37

.22 *** 1.24
.22 *** 1.24
-.13
.88
.04
1.04
-.13 ** .88

.64
.80
.62
.28
-.47

***
***
***
***
***

.87
-.01
-.10
1.07
.86

*** 2.38

.03 *** 1.03
-.74 *** .48
-.11 ** .89

.01
-.18
-.01

*** 1.01
*** .83

.99

1.70
-.40
-.64
2.17
1.78

***
***
***
***
***

5.48
.67
.52
8.77
5.92

.43
-.06
-.17
.55
.45

*** 1.54

.93
*** .76
*** 5.06
*** 3.73

.94
*** .84
*** 1.73
*** 1.58

.84
-.39
-.54
1.10
.92

*** 2.31
*** .68
*** .58
*** 2.99
*** 2.50

.41
-.33
-.37
.55
.46

***
***
***
***

1.50
.72
.69
1.73
1.59

1.89
2.23
1.86
1.33
.63

1.10
1.58
2.13
.64
-1.02

***
***
***
***
***

2.99
4.85
8.43
1.90
.36

.42
.58
.75
.25
-.34

***
***
***
***
***

1.52
1.79
2.11
1.28
.71

.88
1.36
2.26
.61
-.90

***
***
***
***
***

2.41
3.90
9.56
1.83
.41

.46
.78
1.51
.36
-.56

***
***
***
***
***

1.58
2.18
4.54
1.43
.57

Human capital variables
(Less than high school)
High school degree / GED
Some college (vocational, associates)
4-year college or above
Job training
Health conditions that prevent working
2(39)
Log likelihood

16743.81***
45981.32

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Dependent variable is a multi-category poverty status as follows: (0) less than 100% poverty, (1) 100% poverty to less than than 200% poverty,
(2) 200% poverty to less than 300% poverty, and (3) 300% poverty and above.
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4.3.

Differential Effects of Human Capital on the Poor
There are two important findings from these analyses—(1) the

differential effects of human capital on the poor as compared to the non-poor;
and (2) the effects of demographic and employment-related variables on
poverty status. First, this chapter clearly shows that human capital
variables in general are associated with greater chances of being in upper
income categories. Education consistently increases the chance of being in
higher income groups even after controlling for demographic characteristics,
work status, and health status. With regard to both high school / GED and
some college level education, an individual‘s likelihood of being in upper nonpoor groups consistently increase. However, results are mixed when
examining individuals with more than a 4-year college degree. There exists a
differential effect of higher education on the poor and the near-poor. Having
a 4-year college degree or more would make little difference for the poor to
get out of poverty into Category 1, but would help the near-poor to move into
Category 2 and beyond.
This is indicative of social exclusion from the opportunity structure
where lack of higher education represent not the failure to invest in
individual development but the structural vulnerability for those that are in
poverty and those that are at the margin of being poor. Investing in higher
education for the poor may be too simplistic an answer when the segmented
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labor market structure in America is characterized by the growing wage
differentials between the skilled and unskilled workers (Jensen and Slack
2003; Shulman 2003).
As mentioned earlier, of major concern is that the number of lowskilled jobs has been declining in the United States and that the majority of
jobs will require a postsecondary education (Dohm and Shniper 2007; Gittell
Gross and Holdaway 1993). Over the years, the United States has fallen
behind many other industrialized nations in terms of college participation
and graduation rate among young adults. According to a report by the
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education (2006), the United
States ranked 16th among 27 countries compared in terms of college
completion and the college enrollment rate has remained flat especially since
the 1990s while enrollment rate in other countries have been rising rapidly.
As the low-skilled jobs decline, workers with little education have
lower chances of entering the labor market and earning sufficiently to
support a family. Also, majority of students from low-income background rely
on financial aid and loans to support their cost of college education (Choy and
Berker 2003), but the interest rates on educational loans have been rising
over the years and Pell grants have not kept up with inflation. As a result,
higher education has become increasingly unaffordable to students in the
lower rungs of the economic ladder. Of those that choose to attend college,
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many are left with large debt burdens with or without a college degree (Baum
and O‘Malley 2002).
As long as education is used as a screening device to exercise labor
market discrimination (Taubman and Wales 1973), forcing the path of
upward mobility that may be most suitable to the near-poor and upper
income groups would invite even more exclusion of those that are already
excluded. Targeting educational strategies tailored specifically for the lower
income workforce would be desirable. With a strong commitment to basic
education for all—i.e., focusing on high school completion and vocational /
associates degree—and tackling the structural vulnerability at the core—i.e.,
linking with local community-based enterprise development efforts in
partnership with other community resources—would help build ‗employment
hope‘ for the socially excluded.
This chapter also shows that job training programs benefit non-poor
individuals but not the poor individuals. This is consistent with the earlier
discussion of Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) and LaLonde (1995) that
job training does not sufficiently increase the earnings to move people out of
poverty. Job training programs are generally poorly funded and
administered, particularly those that train the very poor (Grubb 1995). The
quality of these programs is mediocre at best. For instance, short-term job
training programs offered to welfare recipients are criticized as placing
overemphasis on quick results and being not rigorous in nature and therefore,
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do not result in upward economic mobility. On the other hand, employer
initiated trainings are much more rigorous and not only result in real skill
development, but also may result in promotion and salary raise. While 87%
of municipalities find that job training is an effective strategy to assist lowincome working families, more than 80% of manufacturers reported lack of
applicants with required education and skills (Katz, Hoene, and Nicole de
Kervor 2004).
Despite WIA‘s original intent to encourage collaboration between
workforce and adult education services, fewer low-skilled adults are being
trained under it Title I and Title II programs (National Commission on Adult
Literacy [NCAL] 2008). The number of people who received training under
WIA was only 206,000 in 2002 and President Bush‘s proposal to double this
number has stood against the congressional proposal to cap or reduce WIA
funding (Patel, 2005). This is detrimental particularly to the low-income
participants whose decline in training under WIA is most pronounced (Frank
and Minoff 2005). From 1998 to 2007, low-income adults exiting the WIA
training program declined nearly half from 96% to 53.7% (NCAL 2008).
Therefore, investing in quality training and increasing resources for the most
disadvantaged rather than the more employable ones will make the
beneficiaries more competitive as job seekers.
Finally, work preventing health conditions negatively affect the odds of
being in upper income groups. This result is just as paramount when it
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comes to implication. The pervasiveness of health at all income categories
highlights its importance. One might plainly take this as an individual
investment issue and call for a healthy lifestyle to increase labor market
performance. Nonetheless, even with the expansion of the State Children‘s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in the 1990s, the number of uninsured
has increased by 9 million people between 2000 and 2006 (DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor, and Smith 2007). And over 8 out of 10 uninsured people are in
working families, and 70% of them are from families with one or more fulltime workers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006). At the structural level, it
would be vital to strengthen the employment-based health coverage and
access to health care services to maintain good health status for individuals
(Kasper, Giovannini, and Hoffman 2000).
Among the findings related to control variables, race and gender need
to receive special attention as they relate to social exclusion. Being nonWhite was found to affect income categories at all levels. While some might
argue that earnings disparities between the Whites and Blacks is due to the
skills that they bring to the labor market and not necessary due to
discrimination (Heckman 1998), Coleman (2003) found that a clear pattern of
racial discrimination that exists in the American labor market, evidenced by
the Black-White wage differences despite having the same set of skills.
Historical disparities in educational attainment have existed between the
Whites and Blacks, and employers continue to avoid hiring inner-city
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minority men even with recent increase in their educational levels (Holzer
1996; Kantor 1999; Braddock and McPartland 1987). It is imperative that
anti-discriminatory and inclusive labor market practices be enforced
concerning racial minorities.
Keeping all other demographic factors, human capital variables and
employment factors constant, the gender effect become more distinct in the
higher income level. For women, the probability of earning above 300% FPL
versus below FPL is 11% lower than for men (see Table 4.3). Other studies
also suggest that men and women enjoy differential earnings (Zhan and
Pandey 2004a). Women are certainly at a disadvantage probably due to
discrimination in the labor market, especially in the upper income level.
Equal opportunity to jobs in the higher income categories will further ensure
upward economic mobility for women at the same rate as that for male
counterpart.
Next, household earner structure was consistently significant in both
the binomial and multinomial models, controlling for marriage and other
variables. This may point to the possibility that, as far as household poverty
is concerned, living arrangements or household structures with extra
earner(s) would be a critical factor rather than considering the mere fact that
a person is married or not married. One could speculate that the current
American economy may require not just the spouse as an additional earner
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but also other household earners to contribute to household income for
financial sustainability.
This chapter found differential effects of higher education and training
on the poor and the near-poor. Human capital in the form of higher
education and training operates not so much as investment for the poor but
as structurally vulnerable attributes in the market place (Rank 2004).
Therefore, promoting upward economic mobility based on investment in
higher education and training may seem less applicable to the poor than the
near-poor. However, for the non-poor, the prospects for upward mobility
improve with every additional level of education. Those with at least a 4years college degree enjoy the highest upward economic mobility prospects.
Training and having work-preventing health status consistently affect the
chances of being in upper income categories.
The three aspects of human capital become all the more important in a
growingly global market place that challenges the traditional theory of
human capital. Reich‘s (1991) warning about the new 21st century U.S.
economy is well warranted. Enterprises are no longer rooted in nation-states
and therefore they lose the community connection by relocating crossnationally wherever quality workforce is available. Public investment in
human capital declines as a result. This further exacerbates the reward gap
between the highly educated ‗symbolic analysts‘ and the unskilled workers.
Symbolic analysts, according to Reich (1991), are the most advantaged and
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marketable few who can cultivate lifelong learning in the new global labor
market.
It is difficult to conceive any element out of education, training, or
health to be missing for lifelong learning to take place in a highly competitive
labor market. Comprehensive programs that ensure basic and postsecondary education, relevant quality training, and health protection would
need to be the full package for a long-term human capital development.
Facilitating this type of workforce development would take combining
development of social capital, cultural capital, work experience, and training
(Schneider 2005).
At the same time, these efforts would have to be accompanied by
economic reforms that focus not just on the ‗employability‘ of individuals but
rather on the development of ‗inclusive labor market‘ that enhances
employment hope for low-income individuals (Hong, Sheriff, and Naeger
2009). This approach would provide a meaningful matching of
comprehensive human capital development and better job opportunities in
order to combat social exclusion (Estivill 2003; Silver 2006) that exists in the
form of underemployment (Livingstone 1997a; 1997b; 1997c) and structural
vulnerability in the labor market (Rank, 2004).
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Chapter 5. Glocal Perspective: Poverty among Welfare
States
5.1.

Structural Vulnerability Thesis
This chapter combines the analyses of the structural and individual

level variables as they relate to poverty status and poverty gap. This is
examined using the multilevel analyses called GEE and HLM. The GEE is
used for the dichotomous dependent variable poverty status and HLM for the
continuous poverty gap. In a series analyses, the effects of socio-politicoeconomic structural variables are sequentially examined along with
individual and household characteristics. The analyses contribute to
empirically validating Rank‘s (2004) structural vulnerability thesis in the
global cross-national context.
Poverty in America according to Rank, Yoon, and Hirschl (2003) is a
result of structural failings at the economic, political, and social levels to
which many poor are vulnerable. These structural conditions are lack of job
opportunities, less generous social safety net, and the high risk of
experiencing poverty in adult lifetime. Rank (1994; 2000; 2001; 2005) argues
that individual poverty is determined by the structural vulnerability of
individuals. In other words, human capital and labor market attributes are
structurally conditioned by their vulnerable positions in the economic system
in the first place which keep the poor in disadvantaged positions in the labor
market.
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5.2.

Multilevel Analysis of Poverty Status

5.2.1. Data and Sample
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data is used to conduct a crossnational comparative analysis of 17 affluent democracies. LIS is a crossnational data archive located in Luxembourg. The number of member
countries continues to grow and the database now covers more than 30
countries with datasets that span up to three decades. LIS constructs
harmonized databases that can be considered as the best source for
international comparative studies.
In order to examine the variations in advanced welfare states, 18
countries were originally selected from LIS Wave 5 (around year 2000):
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK, and USA. Wave 5 data for Denmark did not run with the
rest of the 17 countries and therefore had to be omitted. Focusing on labor
market active age group (between 18 and 65 years of age) of 17 remaining
countries, merging of the data for these countries yielded 120,838 workingage individuals in the sample.

5.2.2. Variables
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Dependent variable is poverty defined as 1 if individuals reside in a
household with less than 50% of the median household income in 2000.
Poverty gap is the second dependent variable which captures the distance of
the poor individual‘s household income to the poverty threshold. This
measure is denoted as GR [in Chapter 3] which by dividing the gap G by the
poverty threshold z, due to the difference in the national currency. Individual level
independent variables include age, gender, marital status, educational level,
labor force status, number of children under 18, and number of earners in the
household. While some countries had information on ethnicity, immigrant
status, and occupational training, there were too many missing values to
include these variables.
Level of education represents the human capital perspective. Based on
the LIS standardization, low education is dummy coded with middle to high
education categorized together as the reference group. Demographic and
employment-related factors found in previous research to have significant
effects on economic outcomes are included. Respondent‘s age, gender
(female=1, male=0), marital status (dummy coded married=1 and divorced,
separated, and widowed with never married as the reference category=0), and
number of children under 18 living in the household. Two employmentrelated variables were included in this study: Employment status of the
respondent (working=1, not working=0) and the number of household
earner(s).
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The country level data set was created by using the OECD data
archive for 2000 and key measures in recent publications. These variables
include: (1) globalization; (2) politics [representation of the poor; cumulative
left party power; and union density]; (3) social welfare commitment [welfare
generosity; active labor market policies; and public educational expenditure];
and (4) economic [unemployment rate]. The globalization variable for 2000
was taken from KOF Index of Globalization which is a composite index of
economic, political and social globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston and
Martens 2008).
The political variables include Jusko‘s (2008) low-income seat and
Brady et al.‘s (2009a) left political party influence and and union density.
The social welfare commitment variables include: Brady et al.‘s (2009a)
welfare state index and OECD‘s active labor market policy spending as a
percentage of GDP and public educational expenditure as a percentage of
GDP. The domestic economic variable includes the unemployment rate from
OECD.

5.2.3. Hypotheses and Analysis
This chapter closely examines the following hypotheses in relation to
the globalization research question (Q1). Controlling for other independent
variables and demographic characteristics,
Q1-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with lower degree of
globalization are less likely to be poor.
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Hypotheses related to the political research question (Q2) are:
controlling for other independent variables and demographic characteristics,
Q2-H(a) Individuals who reside in countries with stronger
representation of the poor will be less likely to be poor.
Q2-H(b) Individuals who reside in countries with stronger Left party
influence will be less likely to be poor.
Q2-H(c) Individuals who reside in countries with higher union density
will be less likely to be poor.
Hypotheses related to the economic research question (Q3) are:
controlling for other independent variables and demographic characteristics,
Q3-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with lower
unemployment rate are less likely to be poor.
Hypotheses related to the welfare states‘ commitment to social welfare
question (Q4) are: controlling for other independent variables and
demographic characteristics,
Q4-H(a). Individuals who reside in countries with higher WSI are less
likely to be poor.
Q4-H(b). Individuals who reside in countries with greater investment
in active labor market policies are less likely to be poor.
Q4-H(c). Individuals who reside in countries with higher educational
spending are less likely to be poor.
In order to test these hypotheses, a multilevel analysis is conducted.
Due to the clustering of individuals within countries and regions, a
generalized estimating equation (GEE) model with a logit link is used to test
these hypotheses (Brady et al. 2008). While this is a comparable approach to
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a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) technique, the actual HLM software
could not be used due to the LIS‘s micro data management policy which does
not allow researchers to have direct access to the raw data. Analyses are
conducted using an online job submission portal called LISSY by which
individuals can submit programs in SAS, Stata, SPSS, or R.

5.2.4. Results
Table 5.1 illustrates the base model (Model 1) without the countrylevel variables. When explaining relative poverty, some common individuallevel demographic variables did not display strong significant relationships
with poverty. Number of children under 18 living in the household and the
number of household earners contributed significantly to the odds of being in
poverty. Also, employment status significantly reduced the chance of being in
poverty. Interestingly, low education was associated with lower probability
of being poor.
Table 5.1: Poverty on Country Variations and Individual Variables

Independent variables

Intercept

Model 1
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

-1.248 (.05)

Country-level variables
Country (Reference=US 2000)
Finland 2000 (108)
Germany 2000 (121)
Sweden 2000 (122)
Italy 2000 (123)
Norway 2000 (124)

Model 2
Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

-.32 (.05) ***

-1.21 (.06)
-1.24 (.06)
-1.25 (.05)
-.91 (.05)
-.98 (.05)
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Sig.

***
***
***
***
***

Netherlands 1999 (125)
Luxembourg 2000 (127)
Ireland 2000 (137)
Austria 2000 (139)
Belgium 2000 (140)
Spain 2000 (142)
Switzerland 2000 (145)
France 2000 (169)
Individual-level variables
Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education

BIC

-1.76 (.09)
-1.63 (.13)
-.15 (.08)
-1.19 (.10)
-1.39 (.11)
-.29 (.06)
-3.87 (.09)
-1.34 (.05)

.0003 (.001)
.03 (.02)
.0001 (.02)
.29 (.01)
-.08 (.03)
-.85 (.02)
-.07 (.03)

***
**
***
*

55441.80

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

.0007 (.001)
.02 (.02)
.02 (.03)
.39 (.01) ***
-.03 (.03)
-1.29 (.02) ***
-.006 (.03)

50697.56

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Model 2 enters the first order country-level variation in order to
examine the cross-national differences in poverty at the individual level.
Being in countries other than the United States alone, except for Ireland, is
associated with significantly reduced chance of being poor. When country
variations enter the model, employment status is no longer significant.
Household characteristics variables—having more children under 18 and
having multiple household earners—maintain their significant presence in
the model.
Table 5.2 shows the relationship between globalization and individual
poverty. Unlike how globalization did not have any significant relationship
with various aspects of poverty at the aggregate level, it was found to have a
significant negative relationship with the probability of being poor.
Globalization decreases the chances of living in poverty. At the individual
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level, number of children and household earners continue to display strong
relationships with poverty.
Table 5.2: Poverty on Globalization and Individual Variables

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level variables
Globalization
Individual-level variables
Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education

Model 3
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 4
Sig.

Sig.

5.67 (.16) ***

5.46 (.31) ***

-.08 (.002) ***

-.08 (.002) ***

-.002 (.001)
.04 (.02)
.01 (.03)
.31 (.01) ***
-.01 (.03)
-1.03 (.01) ***
-.03 (.03)

-.002 (.001)
.04 (.02)
.01 (.03)
.31 (.01) ***
-.01 (.03)
-1.03 (.01) ***
-.03 (.03)

Interaction variables
Globalization * working
Globalization * low education

BIC

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

-1.03 (.01) ***
-.03 (.03)

50697.56

50697.56

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

In Table 5.3, the domestic political variables are examined as they
relate to poverty at the individual level. The number of seats representing
low-income districts had significant negative relationship with the odds of
being poor (Model 5). In this model, employment status and low education
added to the individual effects of household characteristics. The direction of
the effects of low education shifts to where low education affects greater
chance of being poor. In Model 6, left party power contributes to lowering
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odds of being in poverty for individuals. Household characteristics remain
significant, but the effects of employment and education variables disappear.

Table 5.3: Poverty on Country-Level Political and Individual Variables

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level variables
Low-income seat
Left party power
Union density

Model 5
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 6
Sig.

-.48 (.05) ***

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 7
Sig.

-.85 (.05) ***

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

-.93 (.05) ***

-.03 (.0006) ***
-.03 (.0009) ***
-.01 (.0005) ***

Individual-level variables
Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education

.00 (.001)
.01 (.02)
-.02 (.02)
.29 (.01)
-.06 (.03)
-.98 (.01)
.18 (.03)

BIC

52611.42

***
*
***
***

.001 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.04 (.02)
.26 (.01) ***
-.02 (.03)
-.86 (.01) ***
-.02 (.03)

.002 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.02)
.27 (.01) ***
-.03 (.03)
-.81 (.01) ***
-.05 (.03)

53727.05

54674.80

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Table 5.3-1: Poverty on Country-Level Political and Individual Variables
with Interaction Terms

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level variables
Low-income seat
Left party power
Union density

Model 8
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 9
Sig.

-.46 (.06) ***

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 10
Sig.

-.79 (.05) ***

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

-.83 (.06) ***

-.03 (.001) ***
-.04 (.002) ***
-.02 (.001) ***

Individual-level variables
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Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education
Interaction variables
Low-income seat * working
Low-income seat * low education
Left party power * working
Left party power * low education
Union density * working
Union density * low education

BIC

.0002 (.001)
.009 (.02)
-.02 (.02)
.29 (.01) ***
-.02 (.04)
-.98 (.01) ***
-.03 (.05)

.001 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.04 (.02)
.26 (.01) ***
-.08 (.03) *
-.86 (.01) ***
-.08 (.04) *

.002 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.02)
.27 (.01)
-.12 (.04)
-.82 (.01)
-.16 (.05)

***
**
***
***

.003 (.001)
.009 (.002) ***
.006 (.002) **
.005 (.002) *
.003 (.001) *
.004 (.001) **

52592.76

53739.87

54683.87

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Examining the domestic economic variable as it relates to poverty in
Table 5.4, there is a negative relationship. As unemployment goes up, the
odds of individual poverty goes down. Employment status and household
characteristics together contribute to the probability of being poor at the
individual level. It could be possible that this unexpected finding could be an
artifact of Europe‘s more generous welfare states and higher unemployment
rates.
Table 5.4: Poverty on Country-Level Economic and Individual Variables

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level Economic variables
Unemployment
Individual-level variables
Age
Female

Model 11
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 12

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

-1.05 (.05) ***

-1.04 (.07)

***

-.03 (.004) ***

.00 (.001)
.02 (.02)
130

-.04 (.009) ***

.0001 (.001)
.03 (.02)

Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education

.002 (.02)
.28 (.01) ***
-.09 (.03) ***
-.84 (.01) ***
-.02 (.03)

Interaction variables
Unemployment * working
Unemployment * low education

BIC

.002 (.02)
.28 (.01) ***
-.02 (.06)
-.84 (.01) ***
-.24 (.07) ***

-.01 (.01)
.03 (.01) ***

55391.99

55397.37

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Table 5.5 examines the extent to which comprehensive welfare states‘
commitment to social welfare impacts individual poverty. Welfare state
generosity as measured by Brady‘s (2009a) WSI significantly reduces one‘s
risks of being poor. Welfare state works well with other individual labor
market and human capital variables to impact poverty.

Table 5.5: Poverty on Country-Level Social Welfare Effort and Individual
Variables

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level social welfare effort
variables
WSI
Active LMP
Public educational expenditure
Individual-level variables
Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners

Model 13
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 14

Model 15

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

-1.49 (.05) ***

-.63 (.05)

***

.94 (.09)

***

-.49 (.01) ***
-.97 (.03) ***
-.43 (.02) ***

.001 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.02)
.25 (.01) ***
-.06 (.03) *
-.86 (.01) ***
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.001 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.03)
.24 (.01) ***
-.06 (.03) *
-.86 (.01) ***

.002 (.001) *
.03 (.02)
-.05 (.02)
.28 (.01) ***
-.02 (.03) *
-.85 (.01) ***

Low education

BIC

.08 (.03) **

53520.37

.10 (.03) ***

49682.57

-.12 (.03) ***

54037.30

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Table 5.3-1: Poverty on Country-Level Social Welfare Effort and Individual
Variables with Interaction Terms

Independent variables

Intercept
Country-level social welfare effort
variables
WSI
Active LMP
Public educational expenditure
Individual-level variables
Age
Female
Married
Number of children
Working
Number of earners
Low education
Interaction variables
WSI * working
WSI * low education
ALMP * working
ALMP * low education
Pub Edu Ex * working
Pub Edu Ex * low education

BIC

Model 16
β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Model 17

Model 18

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

β̂ (se( β̂ ))

Sig.

-1.50 (.05) ***

-.58 (.06)

***

1.19 (.19)

***

-.52 (.02) ***
-1.04 (.05) ***
-.48 (.03) ***

.001 (.001)
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.02)
.25 (.01) ***
-.05 (.03)
-.86 (.01) ***
.12 (.03) ***

.001 (.001)
.02 (.02)
-.03 (.03)
.25 (.01) ***
-.09 (.04) *
-.86 (.01) ***
.10 (.03) ***

.01 (.03)
.08 (.03) **
.05 (.06)
.18 (.06) **
.03 (.04)
.11 (.04) **

53536.11

49695.98

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

5.3.

.002 (.001) *
.03 (.02)
-.04 (.02)
.28 (.01) ***
-.17 (.19) *
-.85 (.01) ***
-.66 (.19) ***

Examining Poverty Gap using Luxembourg Income Study
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54051.22

This section reviews post-transfer poverty gap as a measure of poverty.
While this measure was not so effective in terms of examining the structural
effects on poverty at the aggregate level, it provides a significant contribution
to the discussion on the depth of poverty at the individual level. Table 5.6
presents summary statistics of people in poverty, calculated using the LIS
data. The poverty gap ratio does not vary greatly across the countries but
becomes a meaningful measure when it comes to asking about how far below
each individual is to the poverty threshold. It is particularly relevant to the
effectiveness of the welfare state as it relates to improving the lives of the
poor.
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics for LIS working age adults (18-65) in poverty
Welfare
state regimes

Social
democratic

Conservative

Liberal

Southern
European
All countries

Countries

N

Poverty gap
ratio

Age

Female

# of children
# of earners
under 18

Working

High
education

Medium
education

Finland (2000)

389

.29

43.07

.51

.44

.74

-

.37

.41

Norway (2000)

503

.31

40.39

.48

.49

.70

-

.26

.63

Sweden (2000)

648

.37

42.38

.48

.61

.71

-

.22

.56

Austria (2000)

130

.24

41.19

.51

.71

.74

.80

.11

.68

Belgium (2000)

104

.25

41.22

.41

.79

.32

.68

.36

.37

France (2000)

523

.25

39.48

.55

1.01

.61

.64

.26

.40

Germany (2000)

577

.27

40.10

.55

.77

.53

.75

.17

.52

Luxembourg (2000)

75

.16

49.56

.45

1.38

.95

.43

.15

.37

Netherlands (1999)

150

.31

39.81

.44

1.38

.78

.77

.23

.47

Switzerland (2000)

167

.31

41.70

.56

1.11

-

.74

.21

.62

Australia (2001)

937

.31

40.58

.48

1.14

.40

.72

-

-

Canada (2000)

2,478

.32

40.24

.49

1.17

.92

.76

-

-

Ireland (2000)

270

.22

40.79

.52

1.29

.46

.66

.18

.29

UK (1999)

2,265

.35

41.64

.52

1.31

.41

.70

-

-

US (2000)

5,493

.33

41.55

.52

1.63

.99

.74

.34

.53

Italy (2000)

635

.31

41.85

.51

.97

.68

-

.12

.40

Spain (2000)

533

.27

38.56

.51

.95

.73

.58

.14

.28

15,877

.32

41.26

.52

1.37

.80

.73

.28

.49

134

This continuous variable allows HLM analysis to be conducted using
SAS. One limitation of the measure is that it is not able to capture the
individuals who were able to leave poverty as a result of social transfers. It is
only observing people who remained in poverty post-transfer which would
indicate the chronic state of poverty experienced by this group. Therefore,
one would be have to interpret the findings with care. The research question
is: How does welfare state generosity affect the depth of poverty for those who
remain poor post-transfer?

Table 5.7: Poverty Gap Ratio on Individual Variables

Independent variables
Random Effects [Country]
Intercept
Working
Education
Social transfer ratio
Residual
Fixed Effects
Intercept
Age
Male
Married
Number of children
Number of earners
Working
Education
Social transfer ratio

BIC

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficients Sig.

Coefficients

.005 (.002) **

Sig.

.07 (.001) ***

.02 (.009) **
.001 (.001)
.02 (.009) *
.07 (.001) ***

.66 (.02) ***

.66 (.02) ***

-.0004 (.0002)
.001 (.005)
-.003 (.006)
.01 (.002) ***
-.11 (.004) ***
.008 (.006)
.001 (.007)
-.56 (.008) ***

-.0004 (.0002)
.001 (.005)
-.003 (.006)
.01 (.002) ***
-.11 (.002) ***
.008 (.006)
-.001 (.01)
-.59 (.04) ***

1876.3

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.
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1702.3

Table 5.7 shows the results from the models without the country level
welfare state index variable. The number of children and the number of
earners in the household remained consistently significant. Social transfer
as a percentage of pre-transfer poverty gap was a new variable that was
calculated and entered into these models. This variable captures the
individual level welfare state effect on poverty and it has a strong
significance in both models. Social transfer ratio also had the between-group
significance in terms of affecting poverty. The greater the average social
transfer ratio of a country the less the post-transfer gap for the chronically
poor individuals.
Table 5.8: Poverty Gap Ratio on WSI and Individual Variables

Independent variables
Random Effects [Country]
Intercept
Working
Education
Social transfer ratio
Residual
Fixed Effects
Intercept
WSI
Age
Male
Married
Number of children
Number of earners
Working
Higher education
Social transfer ratio
Interaction variables
WSI * Social transfer ratio
WSI * working
WSI * education

Model 3

Model 4

Coefficients Sig.

.005 (.002) **

Coefficients

Sig.

.07 (.001) ***

.02 (.008) *
0
.0005 (.0006)
.02 (.008) *
.07(.001) ***

.68 (.02) ***

.68 (.04) ***

.06 (.02)
-.0003 (.0002)
.0009 (.005)
-.002 (.006)
.01 (.002)
-.11 (.004)
.004 (.007)
.001 (.008)
-.60 (.03)

*

***
***

***

-.06 (.008) ***
-.005 (.006)
.007 (.007)
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.08 (.05) *
-.0004 (.0002)
.001 (.005)
-.003 (.006)
.01 (.002) ***
-.11 (.004) ***
.004 (.007)
.001 (.007)
-.59 (.04) ***

-.08 (.05)
-.005 (.006)
.01 (.02)

BIC

1850.8

1719.1

* indicates p<.05, ** indicates p<.01, and *** indicates p<.001.

Table 5.8 reports the results from the models that include the welfare
state index variable. The number of children, the number of earners in the
household, and social transfer ratio were consistently significant. Model 3
shows the significant interaction term between WSI and social transfer ratio
negatively affecting the post-transfer poverty gap ratio. Welfare state
generosity that was non-social transfer related (could suggest non-targeted
programs and policies) in fact increased the poverty gap ratio significantly
among the chronically poor. In Model 4, there was a between-group
significance for country differences in the average social transfer ratio
positively affecting individual post-transfer poverty gap ratio.

137

Chapter 6. Implications for U.S. Poverty
Previous chapters have shown that globalization, politics, and welfare
state generosity provide the socio-politico-economic context in which
structural poverty could be understood. Although tentative, one can draw
from the main findings that politics play a crucial role in light of many
institutional risks and opportunities—open global competition and
restructuring of the domestic industries and responding via the political
system to enhance the welfare state generosity. It is the key mechanism that
protects the social rights of the citizens which in turn translates to reduction
of poverty. Poverty in this sense is rather an issue of social inclusion for
many advanced generous welfare states.
The United States fall significantly behind other rich democracies
when it comes to promoting social inclusion. Largely, the experience of
dealing with poverty in the United States has been superseded by corporate
business interests as the source of employment. This chapter extends Rank‘s
(1994; 2000; 2001; 2004) structural vulnerability thesis and adds another
dimension of why American poverty is an inevitable structural consequence
economically, socially, and politically.
It is to maintain that there is a hierarchical order by which these
structural failings occur using an analogy of a deep-rooted wound (see Figure
1). A structural dependence thesis begins with the idea that poverty exists
naturally among those who play the economic game in the market system
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(Rank 2004). The problem is not so much that poverty is caused by the
economic system but the fact that ideological values and political decisions
are structurally dependent on the economic system. Poverty, understood as a
systemic condition resulting from market failure, is not adequately dealt with
and even exacerbated by the failure of the structurally dependent political
system.
In order to further support this argument, first, I provide an account of
the way in which the ideological value of individualism in the U.S. supports
the market system as the dominant domain by creating an image of selfreliant human beings as the righteous ones. Then, I illustrate how the
political system becomes the prisoner of the market system at the macro level.
At the more micro level, I discuss how business interests dominate the
interest group system (Cahn 1995a) and how moneyed interests obstruct
democratic public policy making (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).
This chapter revisits some classical works to reopen the argument that
the politics of problem definition in the U.S. involve making political
decisions that exclude those without power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) by
keeping other problem definitions at the margin. The structural definition of
poverty becomes effectively marginalized in terms of shaping anti-poverty
policies. Available solutions for poverty, therefore, in this structurally
dependent political environment, are restricted to individually-based ones
since changing the structure would mean questioning the market ideology.
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In turn, government ends up exercising non-decisions and incremental policy
development continues to focus on individual change.

Figure 6.1: Poverty as the Political Wound

(6)

(5)

POVERTY

Individual / behavioral approaches

(4)

(3)

(2)

(1)

Structural / systemic approaches

Truncated Labor Market Policy

Business Power in
Public Policy Decision Making
(Interest group liberalism)

Ideological value system
(Individualism)

ECONOMIC SYSTEM
(Capitalism)
(1) (2) (3): Structurally dependent political system

6.1.

Structurally Dependent Political System
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6.1.1. Economic System as the Structure: Capitalist Ideology
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 3-4, 15) define the term ideology as a
system of related beliefs about how the social, economic, and political
order does and should operate. They see an ideology to be serving
important political purposes by providing not only ―cues for understanding
and evaluating public affairs,‖ but also by serving as ―a guide to action, a
means of self-expression, and/or as a means of relating to other people‖
(Ibid, 4). Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973) further suggest that an ideology
tends to resist change and ―reaffirms its basic principles strongly,
adapting to new conditions and problems only marginally, in patchwork
fashion. In part, this is because a network of social and economic
interests, institutions, and practices is supported and justified by the
ideology‖ (Ibid, 5).
In accordance with America‘s dominant economic ideology being
capitalism-liberalism, there is a continuing intimacy between economic
and political system. In fact, liberalism is the political arm of capitalist
economic system and Americans live in a social system that reflects these
ideologies in both rhetoric and practice. Both see the economic market
place to be the chief instrument through which ―individual self-seeking
will lead to the greatest good for the greatest number‖ (Ibid, 17, 25).
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973) further explain,
Capitalism is an ideology that is concerned with how and why the
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economy should be organized. As the economy is never divorced
from the state or the society, the principles of capitalism relate to
the manner in which the state should be organized and conducted,
and these principles overlap substantially with liberalism.
Liberalism is an ideology that concerns how and in the service of
which values the polity should be organized and operated (Ibid, 18).
Rank (2004) uses an analogy of the musical chair game when
describing the nature of the American economic system. He argues that the
rules of the game itself in capitalist economy, by definition, produce losers in
the first place to which the poor become structurally vulnerable. In other
words, the poverty wound is created in the natural operation of the capitalist
economy. The primary unit of interest in the capitalism is individual rather
than community needs where the former can be satisfied by following the
profit motive – seeking to maximize personal returns or net reward from all
transactions in which they engage (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 27). Also,
by accepting the principle of competition, coupled with profit motivation,
capitalism subscribes to the idea that self-seeking individuals will add up to
greater progress for the entire society.
Like Rank (2004) pointed out, capitalism is not sympathetic to those
who are unsuccessful in the competitive race, viewing them as somehow
―unfit or unsuited for the natural rigors and demands of the real world‖
(Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 28). Artificial forces, such as unions or
government regulations of prices, wages, and trade, inhibit the market to
function as the natural regulator of the economy. In this regard, the class
structure resulting from economic life and the contemporary economic order
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of the United States is taken as fixed or given and no fundamental challenge
is raised to the characteristics, principles, or practices of either (Dolbeare and
Dolbeare 1973, 17).

6.1.2. Ideological Value System: Individualism
Ideology is attached to some values, such as equality, stability,
justice, and individualism. Such values are understood and defined by the
ideology, and ranked in priority (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 9).
Capitalism‘s major value is individualism – individual self-fulfillment
seen as material self-interest and accumulation. This value emphasizes
the moral responsibility, opportunity, and ―the natural rights of the
individual to serve his own needs as he sees fit‖ (Ibid, 17). It is the
responsibility of the individual to ―act purposefully in his own behalf; he
should not be concerned for others, nor should he expect others to serve
his needs for him‖ (Ibid, 32). Gilens (1999) cites Steven Lukes to outline
philosophical varieties of individualism: (1) belief in the intrinsic value
and dignity of individual human beings; (2) belief in the autonomy of
individuals from social pressures and norms; (3) belief in the value of
privacy and the right of individuals to be left alone to pursue their own
ambitions; and (4) belief in the ability of people to develop themselves in
their own unique ways (Ibid, 32).
Individualism essentially has been a response to America‘s concern for
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tyranny by a majority interest (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961) that
translated into a political culture that has evidently feared big government
from day one of the nation‘s existence. American polity is not a structure of
government, but a contract between the government and its people whose
clauses contain shared values of individualism (White 1988, 24). American
political culture, according to Cahn (1995b, 336), is based on the natural or
―inalienable‖ rights of individuals and this liberal individualism creates a
dilemma for public policy. Cahn (1995b, 336) uses the term ―Lockean
individualism‖ to stress its commitment to individual property rights, which
limit the notion of communal rights and create a problematic definition of
communal good.‖ American liberalism, with its utilitarian roots, defines the
common good as the aggregate sum of individual good. The role of
community is to provide the infrastructure to make individual rights possible.
In Lockean terms, the role of the community is to create a stable environment
for the acquisition, use, and disposition of private property (Ibid, 336).
Simply speaking, individualism refers to a belief in the primary
importance of the individual rather than the community (Gilens 1999).
Throughout history, Rank (1994, 200) notes, ―Americans have
enthusiastically embraced individualism.‖ Individualism was embraced
originally as a corrective approach to the rigid social hierarchies and
norms of the European society. Even to this day, it is reflected in the key
characteristics of the American ideal of liberty / freedom – autonomy, self-
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reliance, and full compensation for the private self-seeking (Dolbeare and
Dolbeare 1973, 33). The following quote from a blue-collar worker
typically illustrates Americans‘ adherence to this ideological value:
My God, I work where I want to work. I spend my money where I
want to spend it. I buy what I want to buy. I go where I want to go.
I read what I want to read. My kids go to the school that they want
to go to, or where I want to send them. We bring them up in the
religion we want to bring them up in. What else – what else could
you have (White 1988, 24)?
Indeed, individualism is about ―the insistence upon full opportunity for
individual choices and action‖ (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 33). However,
what this person does not speak to is the fact that individualism also expects
individuals to be accountable for their actions and accept the consequences
whether good or bad.
This value, or this distinct ―culture trait‖, is viewed here as a
mechanism to legitimize capitalist competition, which turned individualism
into a public ideological value in America (Lowi 1979, 40). As such,
individualism as the ideological value restricts poverty to be perceived more
as an individual problem rather than a structural one. Ideological values
attached to individual explanations of poverty play a major role in defining
poverty, advising some strategies for coping with the problem of poverty
while rejecting others (Loewenberg 1974; Jennings 1994). One example
would be understanding poverty based on the individual choice theory
developed by Friedman (1953). It posits that the distribution of measured
incomes at a point in time is ―to an important extent determined by
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individual choice among opportunities that yield both different combinations
of cash income and non-pecuniary advantages, and different profiles of cash
income over time‖ (Johnson 1973, 221). More specifically, according to the
words by Theodore Schultz (1965), measured poverty is a consequence of
voluntary choice. Some people may look worse off in terms of measured
income, whereas they may be better off in terms of utility based on their
choices. What to do about poverty in this instance would be to help
individuals make better choices in life that will improve their chances of
earning a higher pay in the labor market.
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 9) suggest that ideologies seek to attain
―the conditions, institutions, and policies that will permit realization of their
values‖ by way of defending the status quo, drastic changes, and the
development of a series of interim goals. In the case of individualism, a value
representing the capitalist ideology, the status quo is preferred as the
government is prevented from taking the lead in forming a social consensus
on distributive justice. While some societies have taken steps toward
guaranteeing a decent level of well-being for all, the United States remains
reluctant to interfere with individual freedom. Any change to this, as
Dolbeare and Dolbeare (1973, 11) would say, will depend largely on the power
distribution within the society – ―how those in power will force obedience to
the rules that sustain the existing order.‖ Individualism and the power
structure that support this ideological value can be challenged only when the
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conditions are no longer favorable to achieve individual success for everyone
through practices and policies based on individualism.
6.1.3. Business Power in Public Policy Decision Making
Liberalism‘s image of politics in the United States has been termed
pluralism (Lowi 1979) or pluralist democracy (Dahl 1967) by some scholars.
Liberalism sees interest group activities as the leading characteristics of
American politics, ―the means whereby the contemporary political market is
kept open and responsive to popular preferences‖ (Dolbeare and Dolbeare
1973, 59). Interest group is one of the major linkage mechanisms – i.e.,
political parties, media, and election – that provide information about the
public interest to the government leaders. However, when the interests of
economic elites cohere and dominate in key policy areas rather than compete
equally (Parenti 1970), it challenges Madison‘s democratic idea of curing the
effects of the mischiefs of faction with checks and balances at all levels of the
government (see the Federalist, No. 10 in Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1961).
In this sense, the American pluralist system is thwarted in terms of being
structurally captive to the economic environment at the macro level and by
the growing power of business interests at the mezzo level.
Madisonian design of the American political system to encourage
competition among groups and reaching equilibrium in these varying
interests was seen as the way for defining public good (Lowi 1979). Pluralist
representation assumes that the best policy decisions emerge from clashes of
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interest groups in the political arena. This is the process by which issues get
freely and openly discussed and an overall balance of power is maintained.
However, this is an ideal type in the Weberian sense. The idea behind
pluralism was to provide a structure of power with capacity to resist central
political control by any given faction. However, in practice, a market version
of pluralism came in the form of interest group liberalism, which sought to
maintain privileged positions of moneyed interests (Lowi 1979, 58-60). The
conservative tendencies of interest group liberalism were observed in its
resistance to change (Lowi 1979, 60).
Interest group liberalism differs from the original idea of pluralism in
that it condones specific groups, capturing and controlling parts of
administrative agencies without having to compete for policy rewards, which
Lowi (1979) found to threaten the democratic basis of government.
Complexity of issues in present world environment invites different players
into the stage of framing and defining issues. Interest groups are frequently
responsible for bringing the issue to light in the first place (Berry 1997, 7).
Whether small or big changes follow, the process of public policy making
points out that interest groups play an important role at the agenda setting
stagei (Kingdon 1989). In the United States, business interests often control
the agenda in the policy process by maintaining a privileged position
(Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). This makes the task of intelligent,
democratic governmental policy making extremely difficult (Lindblom and
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Woodhouse 1993, 102).
Many studies have documented how America has witnessed a huge
proliferation of interest group activities since the late 1960s (Berry 1997;
Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1983; 1991). This as a result expanded
the interest group system, which comprises the business, trade associations,
professional associations, unions, nonprofits and citizen groups, government
organizations, and others (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). The past interest
representation system has once been dominated by large peak associations or
umbrella groups (Heinz, Laumann, Salisbury, and Nelson 1993, 374).
Namely, some examples would be the American Farm Bureau in agriculture,
the American Petroleum Institute in energy, the American Medical
Association in health, and the Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and AFL-CIO in labor (Heinz et al. 1993).
However, much more diverse sets of actors – particularly individual
businesses – participate directly to influence political decisions these days.
Business groups have come to generate strong voices within the political
system by acting as an interest in society (Berry 1997; Vogel 1989).
Schattschneider (1960, 31) contend that the business community is by a wide
margin the most highly organized segment of our societyii. Since the
Progressive Era when modern liberalism first started to take shape, the
business interests have grown to make up predominantly a large proportion
of the interest group system. Even prior to 1920, the number of trade
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associations and related economic interests were larger in aggregate numbers
than any other categories of interest groups (Tichenor and Harris 2002).
Heinz et al. (1993) estimated that the number of major businesses
strategically operating offices in Washington was 50 in 1961 and 545 in 1982.
Using the data from the 1996 Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Baumgartner and
Leech (2001) indicate that more than half of the Washington lobbying
community consisted of businesses and trade associations when they
examined both direct lobbyists and clients of lobbying firms. Businesses
alone were the largest lobbying group in Washington from the standpoint of
total registrations (43%), followed by trade associations (16%), based on their
study of 5,907 lobbying activities. Business and trade dominance is also
prevalent when examining the degree of activity, as they together added up
to 63% of the reports filed and 63% of the issues mentioned (Baumgartner
and Leech 2001, 1196).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the businesses and trade are by
far the best endowed. Out of the total aggregate lobbying expenditures of
$822,765,784 reported in 1996, businesses and trade taken together
accounted for 78% – 56% and 22% respectively – which was nearly 9 times
more than citizen groups and nonprofits (Ibid). Business dominance is even
more pronounced when observing how the number and type of interest group
representations are distributed across a sample of 137 issues (Ibid). This
extremely skewed distribution overall and the breakdown by different
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categories of interest groups suggested that business advantage was
generally evident but was even more distinct in the cases where the fewest,
especially one or two, interest groups were active. The top 10% of the cases
attracted more than 10% of the interest group activities, while the bottom
10% attracted much less than 1% of the total activities. The proportion
representing the interests of business rose from 57 percent to 72 percent
since 1960. However, the proportion of citizens‘ groups decreased from 9
percent to 5 percent of all organizations and the proportion representing
labor plummeted from 11 percent to 2 percent (Schlozman and Tierney 1986,
77-8).
The central cleavage in the American political system is the clash
between social elements organized around the business community and those
organized around government and not-for-profit institutions in the public
sectoriii (Walker 1983, 392). Therefore, it makes a great difference whose
game is played in politics (Schattschneider 1960, 48) because the rules of the
game determine the requirements for political success. Criticizing the
pluralist approach of mobilizing interests, Schattschneider (1960) wrote, ―the
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong
upper-class accent‖ (cited in Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 11). Business has
been able to mobilize the social bias around the idea that the market is the
primary source of jobs, and that any harm to the business is a threat to
survival as a society (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993).
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6.1.4. Truncated Labor Market Policy
If economics is so central to American social development, why has the
range of policies that sought to promote employment or modify the operation
of the labor market been so truncated in America? Weir (1992) provided a
detailed historical analysis of employment policy development by examining
how citizens and politicians came to define problems, how they understood
the range of choices open to them, and how they interpreted interests
attached to a given set of possible policies. Instead of considering policy as a
direct product of preferences of politicians and voters, Weir (1992) stressed
‗what is possible‘ or ‗what government is able to do‘ as critical to determining
how problems are defined. This was outlined as the process of possible
solutions shaping public decisions rather than about what is desirable.
Central to Weir‘s argument in this seminal work is that employment
policy was organized and implemented in ways that progressively narrowed
the realm of the possible and desirable. Policy decisions reached in the 1940s
restricted the scope for later initiatives leading to 1980s by channeling
debates and subsequent political activities along distinctive paths. She
points to the remedial and ad hoc nature of American employment policy that
added to frustration in lack of innovation. Then, she illustrates the ways by
which noninterventionist Keynesian stabilization policy emerged as the
major employment policy in the United States.
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Next, she details the evolution of labor market policy as it became
subsumed into the War on Poverty in the 1960s and as it took the form of
public service employment during the 1970s. By emphasizing racial
differences as it attached to the low end of the labor market, employment
policy attracted various oppositions for being a special interest measure to
African-Americans. Also, because it was based on the limited capacities of
federal government, particularly with the Department of Labor, it was
criticized for waste, fraud, and corruption in administration. The latter half
of the 1970s can be characterized by the failure of attempts to establish
planning mechanisms and forums for tripartite cooperation.
American exceptionalism in policy-making coupled with constraints in
American politics and culture can be linked to the sequence of changes and
the ways in which policies collide with unanticipated events (p.162). Weir
(1992) supports how factors such as economic pressures, social movements,
and politicians push policy outcomes one way that particular policy decisions
become contingent on these uncontrollable circumstances. The economic
boom that followed World War II bolstering the argument against the
passage of Full Employment bill, the emergence of the southern civil rights
movement and urban riots in the 1960s, the collision of employment policy
with black political mobilization, President Kennedy‘s assassination, and the
escalation of Vietnam War were all contingent factors affecting the remedial
form of employment policy.
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These policy decisions exercised an enduring effect on future
possibilities by limiting the kinds of choices likely to emerge for consideration
(Weir, 1992). Referring to this bounding effect as boundaries, Weir (1992)
argues that existence of Council of Economic Advisors further limited the
problem definition of unemployment caused by insufficient macroeconomic
stimulation and lack of job readiness among the poor. Also, prior
establishment of state-level system of vocational education, which was poorly
linked to the labor market, helped narrow the scope of policy. Established
arrangements characterized by scant interests that organized labor expressed
in enhancing the training capacities of American government left the
business to shape the market-oriented employment policy.
All in all, a comprehensive employment policy was undermined by the
very lack of interplay between ideas, politics and administration. Public
philosophy and research as ideas served little to support planning for a
comprehensive employment policy. Defining unemployment problem to be
more individual rather than resulting from operation of the economy did not
help to form a political rhetoric for more government responsibility in the
domain of employment. Furthermore, the history of administrative failure
was in no position to influence innovative employment policy. In turn, the
resurgence of neoclassical assumptions about unemployment provided a
rationale and language for the new politics of employment in the 1980s.

6.2.

Structural Dependence of Public Will
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Marginalization of structural poverty—poverty understood as a
structural condition resulting from the market‘s failure to include everyone—
is exacerbated by the structurally dependent public will. Iversen and
Armstrong (2006, 206) assert that public will is ―freedom and responsibility of
choice and choice making that is based on the foundational American
principles of fairness and real opportunity.‖ They contend that these
principles are ―obscured by geographic and political dispersion and by
neoliberal reliance on the market to solve all ills and needs‖ (Ibid, 9). The
market certainly enjoys the upper hand over the public will, as the latter is
conditioned by how the former defines the degree to which fairness and real
opportunities are acceptable and do not hurt the interest of the market.
Frustrated liberal social scientists charge that ideology and politics are
to blame for the ―paradox‖ of ―poverty amidst plenty‖ (O‘Connor 2001, 3). An
ideology is typically ―held by some segment of politically active people and it
has the potential of gathering support and affecting American politics‖
(Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 3). A dominant ideology, which is capitalismliberalism in the case of the United States,
may be so pervasive, so all-encompassing, that it is not even perceived
by observers and analysts. Or the observers and analysts may be more
or less willing parties to the routine task of using that ideology for
social control purposes—in this case, for the purpose of persuading
others that the structures, policies, and practices (and the result
thereof) of ruling elites were inevitable, desirable, and widely accepted
by all strata of the population (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 1).
Generally speaking, the capitalist economic life is central and politics
occupies a strictly secondary sphere (Ibid, 56). Liberalism, in its classic usage,
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is much like capitalism in that it stresses ―primacy for the individual and
strict limitation upon governments to ensure full freedom for the individual
to serve his needs as he saw fit‖ (Ibid, 55). Capitalism and liberalism both
share the basic value of individualism. Having its roots in John Locke‘s idea
that individuals have the right to have their property secured, in liberalism‘s
conception the sole purpose of government was to protect this natural right of
individuals. As capitalism became more prominent, liberalism evolved to
apply capitalist principles to the organization and operation of government.
Dolbeare and Dolbeare explain this process as follows:
Liberalism‘s worldview not only assumes that the political system‘s
task is to support and promote the operating capitalist economic
system, but it views the political process itself through capitalist
economic concepts. Politics is seen as a free market for the exchange of
demands, support, and public policies. Each individual has his specific
wants and equivalent purchasing power—one vote. He buys the
policies and candidates of his choice in the competitive market on
election day. If the products are not available, the demand will soon
create the supply. Officeholders act as brokers, adjusting government
policy products to the wants of the number of consumers necessary to
obtain the votes of a majority. In this fashion, participating individuals
control major government policies, which in turn may be understood as
flexibly responding to changing popular preferences and representing
the public interest. In realistic and modern language, this is democracy
(Ibid, 57–58).
On this note, Bowles and Gintis (1986) were not shy about claiming
that democratic institutions have been mere ornaments in the capitalist
economy and that both liberty2 and popular sovereignty3 have been sacrificed
to securing economic hegemony. Similarly, Hofstadter (1948) argued that for
the framers of the U.S. Constitution, political liberty was tied to property and
not to democracy. This argument supported Beard‘s (1935) historical
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analysis, in which he asserted that the self-interested economic elites drove
the creation of the Constitution from the very start at the expense of the
debtor classes—that is, the disenfranchised and small farmers. The resulting
political economy of the American society was the direct manifestation of the
framers‘ principle, which gave the market an upper hand over democracy
(Cahn 1995a).
If one typifies political and economic development as path dependent
with increasing returns (Pierson 2000), one could argue that the Constitution
was the critical juncture of politics and economy; it has had long-lasting
consequences with positive feedback to this very day. As such, the market
continues to dominate the political life in America. The structural
dependence (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988) of the government on the
market provides the context within which business interests benefit from
their privileged positions (Block 1977; Miliband 1969; Lindblom 1977). In this
sense, the market can be characterized as a ―prison‖ that limits political
change and discourages attempts to improve political institutions (Lindblom
1982, 329).
It is a prison in the sense that often the market is treated not as a
variable but as the fixed element around which policy must be fashioned
(Lindblom 1982, 333). The market is an automatic system that triggers
punishment in the form of unemployment or slow economy. Many types of
institutional changes are of a character that the market does not like;
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consequently, it reduces the inducements to provide jobs and performs its
functions less effectively. In this market-based structural environment, the
desire for reelection locks up politicians and forces them to favor business
interests over public interests (Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993; Smith 1999).
One example that best characterizes this structural dependence is the
employer-centered low-wage labor market. Government plays little role other
than to reinforce the employers‘ demands. The market stays constant and the
job seekers become variables in the equation of top-down labor matching that
is designed to bring together the low-skilled workers (labor supply) and the
employers with low-paying jobs (labor demand). While local companies and
other institutions wrestle with the forces of globalization and restructuring,
the market faces almost no challenge to be more inclusive when survival is
the priority. In other words, the main focus of workforce development has
been on changing the ―qualities and capabilities‖ of workers themselves
(Melendez and Harrison 1998, 3), rather than on addressing the structural
conditions of labor mismatch that are heavily weighted toward the demand
side.
Seccombe (2007) points out that welfare is a problem of the low-wage
labor market‘s inability to provide adequate income for low-income families,
rather than of the demoralizing system itself. Moving people from welfare to
work by human capital development (HCD) and labor force attachment (LFA)
depends on how the demand side of the labor market pictures a qualified
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worker. According to Holzer (1998), employers identify absenteeism and
basic skill readiness as potential problems for welfare recipients seeking
employment. During the employer screening process, particular credentials
such as a high school diploma, work experience, and references are widely
used (Holzer 1998). Notably, specific experience/training and passage of
certain tests are required by some employers. Based on these screening
devices, the top-down matching process begins by preparing welfare leavers
to become work-ready or employable.
Regarding the issue of public housing, the Chicago Housing Authority‘s
(CHA) Plans for Transformation is a good example of how developers‘
interests dominate over those of residents (Bennett, Smith, and Wright,
2006). The CHA process focuses heavily on transforming buildings and
deconcentrating poverty through relocation vouchers, and establishes
stringent self-sufficiency criteria for former public housing residents to move
back into newly developed mixed-income neighborhoods (Bennett, Smith, and
Wright 2006). When the public will stays structurally dependent and the
economic structure is kept constant, individual explanations of poverty will
by default continue to overshadow structural explanations that require
systemic change to address the problems. Because of this entanglement,
ensuring basic human rights and advancing the common good are distanced
from the main goals of the U.S. anti-poverty policies.
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This chapter maintains that the structural dependence of public will
discourages poverty from being recognized as a public problem, and therefore
allows the government to remain passive and follow policies that are guided by
individual-based problem definitions of poverty. Releasing the public will from
structural dependence should provide a context in which structural poverty is
recognized and reflected in public policy debates and formulation. The
challenging reality before us, however, is an employer-centered, low-wage
labor market around which many policy and program alternatives are
formed. Achieving self-sufficiency has gained ground as a new approach to
helping the poor achieve the American Dream, in rejection of welfare
dependency that has been politicized as the cause of trapping many people in
poverty.

6.3.

Glocalizing Strategies to Combat Structural Poverty

6.3.1. The End of Structural Poverty—Thinking Globally
The idea that people ought to be self-sufficient or self-reliant prevents
many Americans from reaching out to others to receive or provide help. With
very little political challenge, this notion of self-sufficiency has become the
political engine of public policy. The post-welfare-reform policy practice in the
nonprofit sector uses this concept as its main goal and measure of success. In
fact, self-sufficiency is a myth (Shain 1994). No one in this world is truly selfsufficient. All people have to rely on others to produce various goods and
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services to meet their needs. For instance, one has to rely on others to
produce milk, meat, bread, books, computers, and other necessities in life
that get exchanged in the market. Also, workers are labor-market dependent,
relying on the availability of jobs, payment of wages, and the possibility of
positions opening up. Even some unemployed rich and upper-middle-class
members remain family dependent for maintaining financial security.
Instead of demonizing dependency as a social ill or failure,
individualism as the market value should be complemented with greater
emphasis on community and cooperation (Dolbeare and Dolbeare 1973, 20).
Society is made up of interdependent individuals, so it is vital to understand
economic mobility as a relational process that ―leads toward the
establishment of genuine trust and reciprocity in the intersecting
relationships among education and workforce development institutions,
workers and firms, as well as families, firms, and children‘s schools‖ (Iversen
and Armstrong 2006). To achieve any social or political change, individualism
must be accompanied by the common-good approach that values everyone in
a mutually dependent society.
What, then, can be done at the global level to restore the public will?
This article proposes a glocalization strategy, which is a hybrid between
global thinking and local action. Thinking globally to end structural poverty
begins with the understanding that global disparities in economic development
threaten world security. Mindful of this concern, Sachs proposed to achieve the
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Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by performing differential diagnoses,
accompanied by an investment plan, a financial plan, a donor plan, and a public
management plan suited to the particulars of the local context. He also
suggested that ending extreme poverty by 2025 will require addressing the debt
crisis, global trade policy, science for development, and environmental
stewardship at the global level. A global network of cooperation, in which the
richest countries commit to fight poverty, is essential for achieving these goals.
A movement toward an enlightened globalization is promoted to ―address the
needs of the poorest of the poor, the global environment, and the spread of
democracy‖ (Sachs 2005, 358).
Capitalism is an ideal-type ideology. When power gets mixed into an
ideal type, which is quite common in human history, it becomes something
other than the best intention behind the idea. As for the market, its welfare
function continues to be minimized by externalities. This jeopardizes not only
the people who do survive the competitive market demands for labor, but also
those who get left behind, particularly as the middle class starts to join the
ranks of the working poor. Nathanson (1998, 137) states that once jobs
become scarcer, and as poverty persists amidst extraordinary plenty for
some, the impetus toward greater economic justice will be strengthened.
Establishing a global social-policy system (Deacon 1997) would provide a
safety net for people who become victims within the global capitalist market.
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Reforming or revising the degree to which America is committed to the
capitalist ideology is important when it comes to the welfare of people
(Seccombe 2007). A social-reform approach would have to focus on ―making
capitalism work‖ in the interest of renewed public will to promote fairness
and real opportunity (Iversen and Armstrong 2006). Public commitment to
providing publicly endorsed and funded work supports, affordable pay, and
benefits matters in encouraging upward mobility. Effective workforce
development efforts require a collaborative venture among employers,
community-based organizations, the public sector, and educational
institutions. Iversen and Armstrong (2006, xli) cite Hart (2005), who argued
that this reform would have to be an inclusive practice: ―By creating a new,
more inclusive brand of capitalism, one that incorporates previously excluded
voices, concerns, and interests, the corporate sector could be the catalyst for a
truly sustainable form of global development—and prosper in the process.‖
Bennett, Smith, and Wright (2006, 310) asked ―Where Are Poor People to Live?‖
and called for national and local public commitment to affordable housing:
Fundamental human rights have been undermined by recent trends in
U.S. public housing policy. . . . To develop new housing programs that
meet the needs of America‘s low-income population via locally sensitive,
publicly responsive institutional mechanisms actually looks like a
meaningful, manageable step in reconstituting United States public
policy.
One thing that is critical to combating poverty at the policy level is to have
this condition regarded as a public problem. Considering Wood and Doan‘s
(2003) threshold model, individuals are more likely to voice their discontent
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when their perception of the social nonacceptance rate is lower than the
actual nonacceptance rate. The breakpoint for change from the silent (noaction) state to public-outcry (public-problem) status is the point at which the
perception corresponds to the actual rate of nonacceptance. Creative bridging
of this gap will be key to transforming poverty from a mere condition to a
public problem.
First, it will be important to accurately and regularly report the results
of public opinion polls on poverty, and to promote public education about the
structural effects of poverty on the rest of the society. Second, it will be vital
to provide evidence, informed by sound research, that poverty in many ways
is not a consequence of choice exercised by the poor. Third, it will be crucial to
reinvent the mental image of poverty by influencing the media portrayal of
poverty. These measures are especially important when it comes to
reimaging poverty among children and families who play by the rules.
Parents who have to work two jobs to try to make ends meet face difficulties
finding time or energy to parent. The employment and poverty issues quickly
become a parenting issue that would plague any similarly beleaguered
family. Children often end up taking care of themselves, with all the
consequences that result from that for their well-being.
Adapting a conflict resolution model offered by Johan Galtung (1999),
we can seek reconciliation between the individual and structural
explanations of poverty. Figure 1 depicts a way in which an agreement on
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poverty can be achieved between Party A (i.e., individual problem definition)
and Party B (i.e., structural problem definition). Party A holds a problem
definition at point A (a,0) while Party B maintains its own at point B (0,b).
Both Parties A and B are most satisfied when their problem definitions are
each accepted, which will give a total gain of (a x b)/2, or the entire right
triangle below the line connecting the two positions. Consequently, there is a
natural tendency to exercise policy monopoly by these parties in competition.
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Figure 6.2: Towards an Inclusive Problem Definition of Poverty

An Inclusive
Problem Definition

B (0,b)

E (a,b)

Party B prevails

Both parties prevail

Compromise
D (a/2,b/2)

Withdrawal / delay
C (0,0)

A (a,0) Party A prevails
Problem ownership
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
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This win-lose conflict situation cannot be resolved by the compromise
of meeting halfway at point D (a/2, b/2). This is because both parties would
have to sacrifice some portions of their desired definitions, and only gain the
small square area within the triangle ([a x b]/4), instead of their potentially
most satisfying gain of (a x b)/2. Therefore, point D (compromise) could never
be achieved between the individual and structural problem definitions of
poverty, because D is not a stable condition and the continued tension would
stabilize only when the new equilibrium was reached at point A, B, or C.
When the public is split on its view of poverty, both parties will withdraw and
stabilize at point C (0,0), where the default individual explanation gains
ground.
Social policy entrepreneurs should take the lead in reframing or
refocusing the issue of poverty within the concept of well-being or social
inclusion, and bring the two explanations to a common acknowledgment that
a problem of poverty exists reciprocally at both the individual and structural
levels. Point E (a,b) is where both parties prevail, because the boxed area
defined by (a x b) is inclusive of both problem definitions and the focus on
poverty has been shifted to a broader concept. Both individual and structural
approaches, proposed according to their respective problem definitions, could
be attached to solutions to improve the well-being of people. This is the
minimum threshold point at which an agreement can be reached, by giving
both the conservatives and the liberals a winning ticket. When we transcend
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the conflict between the two major explanations on poverty, an agreement on
strategies to tackle poverty as a public problem can be achieved anywhere
beyond this point in the shaded area, as a win-win solution.

6.3.2. Acting Locally for Inclusive Labor Market Development
Arguably, American capitalism is no longer an economy constrained by
the national boundaries. Monetary stability will trump state sovereignty
when increased international trade and investment require a stable currency
value of a given country (Nitzan 2001). Therefore, when government can play
only a very minimal role in balancing the market to protect the public
interest of all the people, a proactive approach to reforming the market
dominance must be accompanied by a bottom-up approach. The second part
of the glocalization strategy—acting locally within the global paradigm—
suggests local development of an inclusive labor market system.
In A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985), Dahl addressed the
fundamental question of what core values constitute or underlie a just society
and how Americans or world citizens could build a system that incorporates
these values. He challenged the current American system, which does little
(or is incapable of doing much) to protect the fundamental democratic values
of equality, liberty, and justice. He suggested that a system of self-governing
enterprises—a workplace democracy—would be one in which equality and
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liberty could balance out by extending democratic principles into the
economic order.
This idea presents worker-owned and worker-controlled enterprises as
a better foundation for democracy, political equality, and liberty than the
current system of corporate capitalism. The main concern is that the older
vision, based on an equality of resources maintained by the American citizen
body of free farmers, no longer fits the new economic order. This new reality
is constrained by economic enterprises that have heightened the inequalities
among citizens in terms of wealth, income, social standing, education,
knowledge, occupational prestige, and authority.
Dahl compared his postulated self-governing enterprises to corporate
capitalism and found several advantages in the former. For example, selfgoverned economic enterprises would make the task of regulation and
redistribution much easier than in a system of corporate capitalism. Also,
Dahl saw that full and equal citizenship in economic enterprises would
greatly reduce the adversarial and conflictive relationships within firms, and
therefore in society and politics at large. Moreover, it could create
participatory democracy and produce changes in human behavior. He
stressed that the nature of this system would ―reduce the conflict of interests,
give all citizens a more nearly equal stake in maintaining political equality
and democratic institutions in the government of the state, and facilitate the
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development of a stronger consensus on standards of fairness‖ (Ibid, 1985,
110).
Further, Dahl emphasized the importance of democratically governed
economic enterprises by highlighting the importance of a democratically
governed state. By exercising the right to govern democratically within
economic enterprises, he asserted, one can possibly attain the goals of
political equality, justice, efficiency, and liberty. However, he did note the
limitation that self-governing enterprises would still require a central
government to exercise authority over many important matters irresolvable
within the market system alone: military actions, foreign affairs, fiscal and
monetary policies, social welfare, and others.
What did Dahl suggest for a new economic order if we were to make
changes? He pointed out five goals that must be met to ensure political
equality, the democratic process, and primary political rights: justice,
economic fairness, efficiency, a good form of government, and decentralization
of power. To achieve these goals, he recommended establishing an economic
order that would decentralize many significant decisions among autonomous
economic enterprises; that would operate within the market system; and that
would function under democratically imposed laws, rules, and regulations.
He argued that self-governing enterprises achieve these goals, and
consequently greater equality and liberty, much better than the system
Americans currently possess.
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Schumacher (1973) was an early thinker in proposing ―smallness
within bigness‖ as a strategy for effective operation of a large organization.
This view maintains that effectiveness in large capitalist systems or
governments is preserved when their elements or constituents behave as a
network of small organizations. Offering a holistic approach in dealing with
the multiplicity of economic stressors, this type of community-based practices
can best address structural poverty by first developing individually tailored,
need-based program planning for working-poor families (Wall et al., 2000).
To support the discussion of glocalizing the economic enterprise, this
article ends by introducing the model of community-based enterprise (CBE),
which Peredo and Chrisman define as ―a community acting corporately as
both entrepreneur and enterprise in pursuit of the common good‖ (2006, p.
310). Through this process of reclaiming community power, individuals and
families can rebuild self-efficacy and social fabrics. Members of the
community collectively assemble a social vision, which is accompanied by
creation of community-based market opportunities. CBE is process driven
and encourages close participation of community members as key players in
ownership, management, and employment. CBE also promotes
entrepreneurial activities based on available community skills, thereby being
more sustainable than a model based on business demands. Community‘s
social vision and local resources shape local alternatives for economic and
social objectives. Through a participatory decisionmaking process, CBE
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addresses ―the diversity of needs at both the community and
individual/family levels‖ (Ibid, 323).
Using the CBE theoretical perspective, a bottom-up community
building approach can facilitate market creation and venture opportunities
that are rooted within the community. This could take the form of
collaborative partnerships with community resources (schools, cultural
centers, churches, hospitals, banks, etc.), businesses, and human service
agencies to generate a holistic support system that ensures economic wellbeing of individuals and families. All these require a strong public will at the
community level, but not necessarily at the national or global levels, to
encourage multi-institutional collaboration and to promote the common-good
approach.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
This dissertation found in the earlier chapters leading up to the
multilevel approach that social welfare effort in the global context is
determined more by socio-economic development than political development.
However, politics play a rather important role when the analyses become
more controlled and executed among 17 affluent democracies. Globalization
and politics play a more significant positive role on social welfare effort
among the advanced democracies. Globalization also has a positive effect on
politics. Poverty at the aggregate level based on a series of bivariate analyses
is not associated with globalization but with politics and social welfare effort.
Local determinants of poverty show that human capital and demographic
variables significantly affect poverty, but with differential effects of human
capital for the poor compared to the near poor.
Results from the multilevel analyses indicate that individuals who
reside in countries with higher degree of globalization and greater left
political power are less likely to be poor. Plus, those residing in countries
with higher welfare state generosity and active labor market policies are less
likely to be poor. Controlling for individual level demographic and human
capital variables, the global and nation level structural variables were found
to be significant. Individual poverty is affected by: (1) globalization; (2)
politics [representation of the poor; cumulative left party power; and union
density]; and (3) social welfare commitment [welfare generosity; active labor
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market policies; and public educational expenditure].
What does this mean for the politics of poverty in the United States?
Without any doubt, throughout the history of humankind, there have always
been those who were poor because of their laziness, incompetence, and
making wrong decisions in life, who have been labeled as the ―undeserving
poor‖ (Burton 1992, 24; Gilens 1999, 66; Schiller 2001; Spicker 1993). The
contrast between Americans‘ desire to help the poor and their equally strong
desire to cut back on welfare spending springs from the public nonacceptance of the latter between the deserving poor and the undeserving poor
(Gilens 1999, 66).
The deserving are those who try to help themselves and share a
commitment to individual responsibility rather than those who prefer to rely
on the government for support. However, one cannot generalize their lack of
motivation to their own fault alone. The contemporary American society is
much more multifaceted than to simply allow individual explanations to take
credit for being the main cause of poverty. To attribute poverty in general to
this view needs a premise that it is possible for most of these people to escape
poverty if they made efforts to do so.
It is difficult to perceive that contemporary America is a land of
freedom that will provide what every hard working individuals could make
something of their abundant opportunities (Hacker 1998). Levy (1998)
supports this with a skeptical view on the labor market capacity that there
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has been an increase in skill bias that reduced opportunities for less-educated
labor in all industries beginning in the early 1980s. The term American
Dream for many people seems to have lost its meaning to become what the
word itself literally spells out – a dream unreachable for many more people
as society came to develop more on the highly competitive capitalist ground
(White 1988; Rubin 1994; Schwartz 1999).
Hacker (1992, 30) wrote about his concern that this society places so
great a premium on getting ahead in the market system that ―it cannot spare
much compassion for those who fall behind.‖ Those who fall behind in the
United States tend to be blamed for their individual lack – lazy, hostile,
violent, not wanting to work, low IQ, culture of poverty – rather than to be
considered victims of institutional discrimination or other structural
inequities (Hacker 1992). The perception on poverty still, in great degrees,
remains attached to the individual explanations (White 1988). This
represents what the United States over the years decided to do about poverty
as a society. Along this line, Loewenberg (1974) noted:
How a society defines a problem will specify in large measure the
intervention techniques that can be utilized… The various
strategies designed to intervene in poverty or to alleviate its
effects are chosen not for their effectiveness but because they
promote or interfere with our major value systems. Thus,
training programs are nearly always favored because they seem to
be geared toward work; whether or not the training is for real jobs
is almost beside the point (p.47).
Then, is America out of luck in terms of doing something collectively
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about the condition of poverty? The answer to this question would be a
simple ―yes‖ if the discussion were to end by highlighting the structural
dependence of the political system, discouraging poverty from being recognized
as a public problem, and therefore the government remaining passive with
policies that are guided by individual problem definitions of poverty.
Demonizing the business interests as ―one big happy family, united around a
common agenda of goodies they want from the federal government‖ (Berry 1999,
6) would only resort to radical solutions such as not playing the current game of
capitalism or changing the game itself.
However, the answer to the question offered here is a very difficult ―no,‖
because many possibilities exist within the system of capitalism yet the
poverty wound has to be treated by each layer that keeps the wound from
healing. And by no means any one of these layers offers an easy or simple
solution and they have to be addressed in a coherent manner. This paper
concludes that progressive innovative community/social development
strategies and counter mobilization of interests by the citizen groups could
bring the cycle of economic dominance back into the hands of the American
public.
Poverty is like a wound created naturally by the economic system, as
Rank (1994; 2000; 2001; 2004) suggested. The structural dependence thesis
would add that poverty exists because the wound remains untreated by the
political agent that represents the people. The poverty wound is the social
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consequence that results from structural dependence of the political system
on the economic system. Progressively breaking this cycle of dependency at
the structural level, and taking proactive actions at the local level, will start
to cure the wound by transforming poverty from a non-issue to a salient issue.
Therefore, the glocalization strategy recommends community and policy
practices that address the structural nature of poverty.
Gans argued that poverty can be eliminated only when it either
becomes sufficiently dysfunctional for the affluent or when the poor obtain
enough power to change the system of social stratification (1972, 288). High
concentration of poverty could work as a dysfunction to the community as a
unit when hopelessness prevails in the absence of motivation for development.
Hopelessness reflects a chronic group psychology reacting to the structural
nature of poverty—racial discrimination, inequality, and depleted resources
and opportunities. Ultimately, reclaiming hope for individuals and families in
many at-risk communities should be the main goal pursued by the
glocalization strategy: thinking globally and promoting bottom-up community
sustainability by building an inclusive opportunity structure.
For future studies, this dissertation recommends further analyses of
the extent of structural effects on poverty, particularly by interpreting the
magnitude of effects. One could also conduct further investigations of other
socio-politico-economic structural variables as they relate to poverty, both
pre-transfer and post-transfer. Particularly there are not many valid
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economic variables that help explain this opportunity structure in the market.
It may be useful to focus on pre-transfer poverty as a measure of market
poverty when analyzing the effect of economic structure on poverty. Also,
when taking additional steps to study the local structure within the global
context, it would be useful to include regional economic structural variables
as a mid-level variable in a multilevel analysis of individual poverty.
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End Notes
Both frameworks of Baumgartner and Jones‘s (1993) punctuated equilibrium and Kingdon‘s
(1995) window of opportunity explain how interest groups define an issue or problem.
ii Schattschneider (1960) noted that the attempt to mobilize a untied front of the whole
business community follows the logic of business politics, that is ―to keep peace within the
business community by supporting as far as possible all claims that business groups make
for themselves‖ (Schattschneider, 1960: 42).
iii The relationship between the government and business largely determine the character of
the regime and ―the struggle for power is largely a confrontation of two major power systems,
government and business‖ (Schattschneider, 1960: 392).
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